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THE ATTRACTION AND LIMITS OF
TEXTUALISM: THE SUPREME COURT





During its 1993 Term, the Supreme Court had the opportu-
nity to consider the interaction between two federal statutory
schemes: the Federal Power Act (FPA),' which provides that the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has the author-
ity to regulate and license hydropower projects,2 and the Clean
Water Act (CWA), 3 which provides that states have the authority
to adopt water quality standards and that federal law will impose
and enforce those standards in regulating emissions into, and the
quality of, waters of the United States.4 The tension created by
these two statutes lies not only between federal agencies, but
more importantly, between federal energy regulators and state
regulators of environmental and water quality.5 Differing views
about the importance of the competing interests implicated by
* Associate Professor, University of Kentucky College of Law. B.A., 1978,
Williams College; J.D., 1984, University of Pennsylvania. Preparation of this
Article was supported by the University of Kentucky College of Law through a
summer research grant. The author thanks Debbie Mains, Class of 1996, for
her work as a research assistant.
1 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-823b (1994).
2 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (1994). The Federal Power Act (FPA) provides that
the Federal Power Commission has authority to license hydropower projects.
See id. § 796(14) (defining the term "Commission'). These powers were trans-
ferred from the Federal Power Commission to Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) in 1977. 42 U.S.C. § 7172(a)(1)(A) (1988).
3 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
4 33 U.S.C. §§ 1312-13a, 1341 (1994).
5 There have been other instances when federal and state actors have dis-
agreed about the use of water resources. For example, in the 1970's, federal
and state interests, particularly in the West, disagreed about the appropriate
response to the energy crisis and the issue of water rights. See M. Curtis Whit-
taker, The Federal Powei Act and Hydropower Development: Rediscovering
State Regulatory Powers and Responsibilities, 10 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 135,
136-37 (1986).
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the interaction of the EPA and the CWA reflect a confused 6 and
controversial 7 area of the law, highlighting the significance of hy-
dropower licensing law in the eyes of environmental lawyers.8
The Supreme Court's decision in PUD No. 1 of Jefferson
County v. Washington Department of Ecology9 resolves this con-
troversy, holding that the state certification requirement allows
states to impose significant conditions on FERC licenses to oper-
ate hydropower facilities. This Article uses the PUD No. 1 deci-
sion as an opportunity to examine how the textualist approach to
statutory construction fares when two federal statutes are rele-
vant to the issue being decided. As this Article demonstrates,
the case is important because it illustrates the attraction as well
as the limits of plain meaning as the basis for construing statutes
when a conflict arises.
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the federal li-
censing process for hydropower projects10 and examines why
such licensing decisions substantially affect the quality of the
water in the rivers and streams that generate hydropower.'
Part II of the Article examines the background of the
Court's decision in PUD No. 1. Part II first describes FERC's
successes (and those of its predecessor agency) at the expense of
state regulatory agencies in Supreme Court cases that have con-
sidered the scope of FERC authority under the EPA. Part U
then briefly summarizes the broad continuum of results reached
6 See infra part MI (discussing three different judicial approaches to the in-
teraction of the two statutes).
7 See Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n Hydropower Licensing Program:
Hearing Before the House Comm. on Env'% Energy and Natural Resources of
the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 100 (1993)[herein-
after Hearing] (statement of Marc S. Gerstman, Deputy Commissioner and
General Counsel, New York Dep't of Envtl. Conservation) ("The scope of au-
thority granted to a State under [section] 401 of the Clean Water Act has been
one of the most hotly debated issues among hydropower developers, support-
ers, opponents and regulators over the last two decades.").
8 See Michael C. Blumm, Federalism, Hydroelectric Licensing and the Fit-
ture of Minimum Streamflows After California v. Fed. Energy Regulatory
Comm., 21 ENvrL. L. 113, 113 (1991) ('Hydroelectric licensing under the Fed-
eral Power Act (FPA) is not generally considered a central component of envi-
ronmental law.") (footnote omitted). The potential ecological and
environmental consequences of hydropower projects are summarized infra at
notes 19-26 and accompanying text.
9 114 S. Ct. 1900 (1994).
10 See infra notes 12-18 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 19-30 and accompanying text.
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by courts when deciding how the FPA should interact with the
CWA.
Part III of the Article summarizes and critiques the decision
in PUD No. 1, which had not been foreshadowed by the Court's
prior decisions in the area of federal hydropower licensing. Fi-
nally, Part IV discusses how the Court's decision demonstrates
the constraints of a textualist approach to statutory
interpretation.
I
FERC HYDROPOWER LICENSING AND ITS
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS
The FPA gives FERC the authority to license hydropower
projects.12 A license is issued after a long process, including a
pre-application consultation with FERC,13 and must be periodi-
cally renewed. The length of the process, which may last ten
years or more,14 depends to a large degree on the size of the
hydropower project and its expected environmental impact.15
Some observers claim that when relicensing is involved, FERC
slows the process because projects have a right to operate under
the old requirements during the time that the application for a
new license is being considered.1 6
12 Section 4(e) of the FPA authorizes FERC to license projects that are
"necessary or convenient... for the development, transmission, and utilization
of power across, along, from, or in any of the streams... over which Congress
has jurisdiction." 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (1994); see also United States Dep't of the
Interior v. FERC, 952 F.2d 538, 543 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
13 See Hearing, supra note 7, at 132 (statement of Martin L. Aliday, Chair-
man, FERC) ("[A three-stage consultation process] begins as long as 3 years
prior to the actual filing of a license application.").
14 See Hearing, supra note 7, at 210 (statement of F. Lorraine Bodi, Co-
Director, Northwest Regional Office, American Rivers, Inc.) ("In the North-
west, where some major licenses expired in the 1970's, relicensings have been
taking ten years or more."). Other estimates indicate much shorter time frames
for relicensing. See Hearing, supra note 7, at 195 (statement of Fred E.
Springer, Director, Office of Hydropower Licensing, FERC) (stating that the
timetable for completing applications for relcensing "will range between... a
little less than two years up to possibly 4 years.").
15 See Hearing, supra note 7, at 150 ("If an EIS is required [for a hydro-
power project], that typically adds about a year to the processing time.") (state-
ment of Martin L. Allday, Chairman, FERC); Hearing, supra note 7, at 195
(statement of Fred E. Springer, Director, Office of Hydropower Licensing,
FERC) (noting that the timetable for completing relicensings depends upon
"what complicated EIS's might be involved").
16 See Hearing, supra note 7, at 62 (statement of John D. Echeverria, Coun-
sel, National Audubon Society) (in processing applications for relicensing,
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The term of a FERC license varies; initial licenses may be
valid for up to fifty years, while licenses replacing expired
licenses have terms ranging from thirty to fifty years.17 During
the past three decades, FERC has acted to mitigate the environ-
mental risks associated with licensing for such long periods. "Re-
opener" provisions, included in all licenses, may result in
enhanced environmental protection following public notice and a
hearing1 8
Hydropower licensing by FERC has an impact both on the
electric power needs of the country and on the environmental
quality and ecology of the streams and rivers that produce the
power. Viewed from the perspective of the nation's total energy
capacity, FERC is responsible for about five percent of capacity
through hydropower licensing.19 This capacity is shared among
the approximately 2,000 hydropower projects that FERC
regulates.20
"there is an incentive for delay, because... if a new license is not issued and the
application remains pending, then... the licensees are entitled to continue
operating under the terms of the old license, which in many cases is going to be
more favorable to the owner than a new license would be"); see Hearing, supra
note 7, at 193 (statement of Fred E. Springer, Director, Office of Hydropower
Licensing, FERC) (confirming that "[w]hen [a] FERC license expires and
FERC is processing the application for recent license [sic], in most cases the
license is extended year to year until the relicensing is complete ....
17 Hearing, supra note 7, at 138.
18 See Hearing, supra note 7, at 159.
19 Hearing, supra note 7, at 53 (statement of John D. Echeverria, Counsel,
National Audubon Society) ("In terms of total operating capacity, hydropower
is less than 10 percent of the Nation's energy mix, and the Commission has
jurisdiction over about half of that"); see also Hearing, supra note 7, at 138
(statement of Martin L. Allday, Chairman, FERC) ("Hydroelectric projects ac-
count for about ten percent of all electric power generated in the United States.
As of January 1992, constructed projects under Commission authorization corn-
.prise about 54 percent of the nation's total developed hydroelectric power
capacity.").
20 See Peter J. Kirsch & J. Barton Seitz, Environmental Protection Through
Federal Preemption of State Water Laws, 20 ENvrL. L. REP. (ENvr. L INST.)
10,438, 10,438 (1990) ("Today, approximately 2,000 hydroelectric projects oper-
ate under licenses issued by [FERC]."); Hearing, supra note 7, at 53 (statement
of John D. Echeverria, Counsel, National Audubon Society) ("There are about
2,300 operating hydroelectric projects, and the Commission has jurisdiction
over about 2,000."). But see Hearing, supra note 7, at 137-38 (statement of
Martin L. Allday, Chairman, FERC) ("Currently, there are 1,060 licensed
projects, 646 exempted projects, and 209 proposed projects being studied under
preliminary permit.").
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The environmental impact of these projects is also quite sig-
nificant. Courts,21 interested parties,2 and scholars 23 have all
recognized that the damming, turbine use, and regulated release
of water associated with hydropower projects can be expected to
degrade water quality and harm the organisms that depend on a
river's water quality and ecology.2 Several of these environmen-
tal harms associated with hydropower projects-increased sedi-
mentation, reduced levels of dissolved oxygen, and ecologic
modification.2-were identified in a recent water quality inven-
21 See e.g., United States Dep't of the Interior v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, 952 F.2d 538, 540 (D.C. Cir. 1992). The Circuit Court for the District
of Columbia noted:
The dissolved oxygen level of water determines the capacity of the river
to support marine life and absorb waste. The dams in the Ohio River
Basin increase the DO level by aerating water as it passes over the dam.
Hydropower projects tend to reduce aeration because water passes over
turbines instead of falling freely over the crest of the dam. Fish mortality
from entrainment [in turbines] obviously lowers fish populations ....
Id
22 See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 7, at 94 (statement of Martha G. Prothro,
Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of Water, U.S. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA)). Here, Ms. Prothro stated:
The types of potential adverse impacts associated with hydropower
projects include loss or degradation of aquatic habitat; impacts on wild-
life, fisheries, and endangered species that are dependent upon the
aquatic environment; accumulation of contaminated sediments; nonpoint
source impacts; water chemistry problems such as low levels of dissolved
oxygen; significant changes in temperature; and significant changes in
water flow volumes and timing.
As well, Whittaker has noted:
The possible ecological and hydrological effects of damming or diverting
moving water are numerous, and include silt deposition, concentration of
pollutants, water deoxygenation, increased rates of evaporation (espe-
cially critical in the arid West), altered groundwater flows and drainage
patterns, and disturbance of flora and fauna by altered water levels and
moving turbines.
Whittaker, supra note 5, at 135 n.3 (footnote omitted).
23 See, e.g., Robert H. Abrams, Interbasin Transfer in a Riparian Jurisdic-
tion, 24 WM. & MARY L. Riv. 591, 596 (1983) ("Formerly free-flowing streams
may lose their ability to support some types of sport fishing. If the transfer
requires a reservoir, the reservoir waters will inundate a valley, thus prohibiting
activities such as farming and forestry. Sedimentation behind the reservoir's
dam may result in accumulation of toxins.").
24 See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 7, at 91 (footnote omitted) (statement of
Martha G. Prothro, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of Water, EPA)
("The Columbia River System... has the largest dam system for electric power
in the world. Anadromous fish runs in the Columbia and Snake River Basins
are now estimated to be less than 25% of levels that would have been expected
without the dams.").
25 See supra notes 21-23.
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tory as some of the principal causes of water quality
degradation.2
The severity of these adverse effects is one important expla-
nation for environmentalists' increased concern about the envi-
ronmental impact of hydropower licensing. Another is that,
since the terms of many FERC licenses have recently expired,
there has been a surge of applications for relicensing in circum-
stances in which environmental impacts will be seriously consid-
ered for the first time 27 In addition, FERC is considering many
cases in which multiple projects are located on individual rivers,
26 See Hearing, supra note 7, at 90-91 (statement of Martha G. Prothro,
Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of Water, EPA) (The results of the 1990
water quality inventory indicate that "[tihe most extensive causes of impair-
ment to our nation's rivers... were siltation, nutrients, low dissolved oxygen,
and pathogens. Agricultural runoff was the most extensive source of pollution;
however, hydrologic and habitat modification was the third leading source of
impairment to our nation's rivers.").
27 See Hearing, supra note 7, at 132 (statement of Martin L. AlIday, Chair-
man, FERC) ("In 1991, the Commission received 157 relicense applications for
projects originally licensed many decades ago."); Blumm, supra note 8, at 114
("During the 1990s, more than two hundred projects must be relicensed by
[FERC]. Most of these were licensed fifty years ago, long before reserving
streamflows for fish and wildlife or water quality protection became common-
place.") (footnote omitted); Kirsch & Seitz, supra note 20, at 10,438 ("Many
[FERC] licenses were issued in the 1930s for 50-year terms and are, or soon vaill
be, eligible for relicensing.").
The large number of relicensing applications is attributable to the agency's
decision fifty years ago to establish a uniform expiration date in response to a
Supreme Court decision that otherwise would have granted an undue advan-
tage to particular hydropower licensees. See Hearing, supra note 7, at 194
(statement of Fred E. Springer, Director, Office of Hydropower Licensing,
FERC) ("In 1943 there was a Supreme Court decision which changed the Com-
mission's jurisdiction on navigation.... Because of the new form of jurisdiction
subsequent to 1943... they did not want to give an additional advantage to
those companies for not having been licensed so they made the expiration date
the same day 50 years after the Supreme Court decision.").
This increase in applications for relicensing follows by about one decade a
substantial increase in initial license applications. See Thomas B. Arnold,
Emerging Possibilities for State Control of Hydroelectric Development, 13
ENvrT. L. REP. 10,135, 10,135 (May 1983). Arnold notes that "[t]he past four
years have seen renewed, almost frenzied, interest in hydroelectric power de-
velopment. Id. Applications for permits have jumped from a level of about 20
per year in the mid-1970s to 1,859 in 1981," which Arnold attributes to a greater
opportunity to earn profits by harnessing hydropower. lt Arnold argues that
"[t]he combination of... substantial subsidies and a guaranteed market at the
utility's full avoided cost encouraged a flood of proposals to develop hydro sites
all over the country." Id.
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thus giving rise to troubling issues involving cumulative impacts
and coherence in regulations.2
This tension between the desire to generate hydroelectricity
and the apprehension that its generation will seriously degrade
the environment has grown because of the perception that FERC
will license any project that can be operated at a profit,29 and
that FERC may therefore be unwilling to require the mitigation
of adverse environmental effects because mitigation can often
only be accomplished at the expense of reducing energy produc-
tion or reducing its profitability to the point where the project
loses its utility.30
I
A CONTEXT FOR PUD NO. 1: COMPETING FEDERAL
STATUTES AND STATE INTERESTS, AND CONFLICTING
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS
A. The FPA Mandate of Broad Federal Preemption of the
Licensing Process
1. The FPA's Grant of Power to FERC Regarding
Hydropower Licensing
The FPA grants FERC broad jurisdictional power to license
hydropower projects31 and substantial discretion regarding
28 See Hearing, supra note 7, at 97 (statement of Martha G. Prothro, Deputy
Assistant Administrator, Office of Water, EPA) ("It is our understanding that
by the year 1999, 335 FERC licenses for existing hydropower projects will ex-
pire; 167 of those projects are due for relicensing prior to 1993. The projects are
located on 105 rivers in 24 states. Most of these projects are in northeastern
and midwest states."). As the Chairman of FERC testified:
Where multiple projects are situated on the same river, a single, cumula-
tive EIS or EA could address them all. A very preliminary estimate is
that, of the pending relicense applications, about 48 projects could be cov-
ered in five cumulative EISs; 83 projects could be covered in 26 cumula-
tive EAs; and 24 projects would have indvidual EAs.
Hearing, supra note 7, at 141 (statement of Martin L. AlIday, Chairman,
FERC).
29 See infra notes 88-104 and accompanying text.
30 See Hearing, supra note 7, at 196 (statement of Fred E. Springer, Direc-
tor, Office of Hydropower Licensing, FERC) ("The largest loss of power poten-
tial is not necessarily from dams coming down, but from environmental
mitigation and enhancement measures that might be imposed on these projects
which would send more minimum flows down the stream bed.").
31 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (1994) (granting FERC authority to license projects
"necessary or convenient for the development... transmission, and utilization
of power across, along, from, or in any of the streams... over which Congress
has jurisdiction").
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whether to grant licenses to applicants.3 This expansive federal
role in hydropower licensing reflects the federal government's in-
terest in the use of navigable waters. "The FPA was premised on
the principle that the electric power potential of the nation's nav-
igable waterways is a public resource that should be harnessed in
a manner consistent with the public interest."33 These EPA provi-
sions did not, however, foreclose other regulators-particularly
the states-from playing important roles in the licensing
process 34
2. The Limits on the Preemption of State Water Laws by the
FPA
To determine whether Congress intended to give FERC par-
amount authority over hydropower licensing, one must consider
the extent to which the FPA preempts state control over the
streams and rivers that come within FERC's section 4(e) jurisdic-
tion. The statute's text seems to provide only for limited
preemption:
Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed as affect-
ing or intending to affect or in any way to interfere with the
laws of the respective States relating to the control, appropria-
tion, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation or for mu-
nicipal or other uses, or any vested right acquired therein a5
32 16 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1994) (granting FERC authority to issue licenses
based on c6nditions that FERC determines to be best suited for power genera-
tion and other public uses of the waters).
33 Kirsch & Seitz, supra note 20, at 10,439.
34 The Supreme Court made this point in California v. FERC, 495 U.S. 490
(1990), stating:
In the Federal Power Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 803, 863, Congress clearly in-
tended a broad federal role in the development and licensing of hydroe-
lectric power. That broad delegation of power to the predecessor of
FERC, however, hardly determines the extent to which Congress in-
tended to have the Federal Government exercise exclusive powers, or in-
tended to preempt cbncurrent state regulation of matters affecting
federally licensed hydroelectric projects.
Id. at 496-97.
35 16 U.S.C. § 821(a) (1994). Section 9 of the FPA includes similar language:
Each applicant for a license under this chapter shall submit to the com-
mission... [s]atisfactory evidence that the applicant has complied with
the requirements of the laws of the State or States within which the pro-
posed project is to be located with respect to bed and banks and to the
appropriation, diversion, and use of water for power purposes and with
respect to the right to engage in the business of developing, transmitting,
and distributing power, and in any other business necessary to effect the
purposes of a license under this chapter.
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"[A] quite natural reading of the statutory language" indi-
cates a narrow range of federal preemption.3 6 This natural read-
ing is strengthened by its conformity with Congress' intent that
states retain authority as trustees over the waters flowing within
their borders,37 even though shared authority between the fed-
eral regulator and the states could impede development of some
hydropower projects.3
8
A conclusion that the FPA only narrowly preempts states'
regulation of their waters would be consistent with the general
presumption that congressional action does not preempt state
regulation, particularly in areas where states have traditionally
exercised substantial regulatory authority through their police
powers.39 As we shall see, however, the Supreme Court did not
16 U.S.C. § 802 (1994).
36 California v. FERC, 495 U.S. at 505; see also Kirsch'& Seitz, supra note
20, at 10,440 ("The interplay between §§ 9 and 27 has been the subject of much
litigation and scholarly debate. On their face, these provisions appear to require
FERC to respect all state water laws."); Blumm, supra note 8, at 117 ("One
would not suspect from a reading of the FPA that federal preemption of state
laws is one of its distinguishing characteristics. Two provisions of the Act seem
to indicate that Congress intended to save, not preempt, state law.").
In California v. FERC, the Supreme Court stated:
Were this a case of first impression, petitioner's argument [in favor of
narrow federal preemption] based on the statute's language could be said
to present a close question. As petitioner argues, California's minimum
stream flow requirement might plausibly be thought to "relat[e] to the
control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used.., for.., other
uses," namely the generation of power or the protection of fish.
495 U.S. at 497 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 821 (1994)).
37 See Blumm, supra note 8, at 117 ("Further, the FPA's legislative history
indicates that Congress consciously sought to preserve state water laws.") (foot-
note omitted); Whittaker, supra note 5, at 153 ("The FWPA thus preserved a
pre-existing balance, preserving states' rights while promoting the federal goal
of hydroelectric development."). See generally Whittaker, supra note 5, at 150-
53 (discussing legislative history of the FPA and Congress's intent that states
"retain[ ] their trusteeship and regulatory responsibility over the corpus of their
waters, navigable and otherwise.") (footnote omitted).
38 See Kirsch & Seitz, supra note 20, at 10,440 ("The facial language
of... section§ [9 and 27], however, is not entirely consistent with the intent of
the FPA, which envisions comprehensive federal control over hydropower re-
sources. As a result, the application of these provisions is far from
straightforward.").
39 See California v. FERC, 495 U.S. at 497 (stating that a narrow interpreta-
tion of the scope of federal preemption "would accord with the presumption
against finding pre-emption of state law in areas traditionally regulated by the
States and with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States
were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress") (internal quotations and citation omitted). See
also Whittaker, supra note 5, at 154 ("Although Congress could have asserted
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construe the FPA in accordance with this "quite natural reading'
of its terms.
3. The Supreme Court's Broad Construction of FPA
Preemption of State Law
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of state in-
volvement in hydropower licensing affecting navigable waters in
First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. Federal Power Commis-
sion.40 The Supreme Court recently stated that this early decision
"provided the understanding of the FPA that has since guided
the allocation of state and federal regulatory authority over hy-
droelectric projects. ' '41 In First Iowa, the applicant sought a fed-
eral license to construct a hydropower project that would involve
the "diversion of substantially all of the waters of the Cedar
River near Moscow, to the Mississippi River near Muscatine." 42
Iowa objected to this hydropower project and sought to prevent
its development on the grounds that it did not comply with state
laws.43 The state contended that, under section 9(b) of the FPA,4
First Iowa had to present evidence to the Federal Power Com-
mission (FPC) demonstrating that the proposed project complied
with state law45 Iowa law required that before any dam could be
'control over the water power inherent in a navigable stream' by invoking the
commerce power, it did not do so in the FVPA or any subsequent act.") (cita-
tion omitted).
40 328 U.S. 152 (1946).
41 California v. FERC, 495 U.S. at 498. See also William L Plouffe, Forty
Years After First Iowa: A Call for Greater State Control of River Resources, 71
CoRNELL L. Riv. 833, 835 (1986) ("First Iowa is without question the seminal
case on the federal government's role in approving hydropower projects and
their associated dams.") (footnote omitted); Whittaker, supra note 5, at 159
(stating that First Iowa is "the most important case in shaping present percep-
tions of administrative authority over hydropower development").
42 First Iowa, 328 U.S. at 166. See also Whittaker, supra note 5, at 166. This
diversion was seen as central to the plan to develop the hydropower project. Id.
at 166 ("Such a diversion long has been recognized as an engineering possibility
and as constituting the largest power development foreseeable on either the
Cedar or Iowa Rivers.") (footnote omitted).
43 See First Iowa, 328 U.S. at 159, 164.
4. 16 U.S.C. § 802(a)(2) (1994). This provision is quoted supra note 35.
45 See First Iowa, 328 U.S. at 163-64. The First Iowa court stated:
The question at issue is the need, if any, for the presentation of satisfac-
tory evidence of the petitioner's compliance with the terms of Chapter
363 of the Code of Iowa. This question is put in issue by the petition for
review of the order of the Commission which dismissed the application
solely on the ground of the failure of the petitioner to present such
-evidence.
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constructed, the potential operator had to obtain a state permit,46
receive approval of its plan for construction,47 and ensure that
water diverted to generate power be returned to the stream at
the nearest practical point 48 The Court viewed compliance with
this last provision of state law as effectively inconsistent with the
planned federal project.49
Expressing concern about whether a state could exercise "a
veto power over the federal project, '' 50 the Court examined the
terms of the FPA relating to preemption and the powers that the
states retain under the Act. The Court began its analysis by mak-
ing two general observations about the effect of the FPA. First,
the Court stated that "the Act establishes a dual system of con-
trol," with the federal government and the state each exercising
final authority within the jurisdiction assigned by the FPA.51 Sec-
ond, the Court summarized the general purpose of the FPA,
which was to promote the development of the nation's dormant
hydropower capacity, while protecting the proper jurisdiction of
the states.5 2
rd.
46 I& at 164.
47 Id. at 165-66.
48 J&
49 Id. at 167. The Court discussed the conflict between state and federal
requirements:
Compliance with State requirements that are in conflict with federal re-
quirements may well block the federal license. For example, compliance
with the State requirement ... that the water of the Cedar River all be
returned to it at the-nearest practicable place would reduce the project to
the small one which is classified by the Federal Power Commission as
'neither desirable nor adequate'.
Ia
50 Id. at 164. The Court stated that "[s]uch a veto power easily could de-
stroy the effectiveness of the federal act." Id.
51 Id, at 167. The Court explained:
The duality of conrol consists merely of the division of the common en-
terprise between two cooperating agencies of government, each with final
authority in its own jurisdiction. The duality does not require two agen-
des to share in the final decision of the same issue. Where the Federal
Government supersedes the state government there is no suggestion that
the two agencies both shall have final authority.
Id at 167-68.
52 I& at 171. The Court stated:
We find that when that Act is read in the light of its long and colorful
legislative history, it discloses both a vigorous determination of Congress
to make progress with the development of the long idle water power re-
sources of the Nation and a determination to avoid unconstitutional inva-
sion of the jurisdiction of the States.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal
[Volume 5
THE ATTRACTION AND LIMITS OF TEXTUALISM
The Court then turned to the meaning of the provisions on
which Iowa relied in asserting its authority over the project. The
Court first concluded that sections 9(b) and 27 have different
purposes, based on their terms and location in the statute: section
9(b) governs the information that an applicant must provide to
the Commission and does not save from federal preemption any
more state law than is otherwise saved by the terms of section
27.3 The Court then construed the savings clause (section 27)
quite narrowly, holding that the provision is limited by its terms
to state laws protecting property rights in the waters used or af-
fected by the hydropower project. 4
Id. See also id. at 174.
As indicated by Representative LaFollette, Congress was concerned with
overcoming the danger of divided authority so as to bring about the
needed development of water power and also with the recognition of the
constitutional rights of the States so as to sustain the validity of the Act.
Id.
53 The Court stated that:
The directness and clarity of § 27 as a 'saving' clause and its location near
the end of the Act emphasizes [sic] the distinction between its purpose
and that of § 9(b) which is included in § 9, in the early part of the Act,
which deals with the marshalling of information for the consideration of a
new federal license. In view of the use by Congress of such an adequate
'saving' clause in § 27, its failure to use similar language in § 9(b) is per-
suasive that § 9(b) should not be given the same effect as is given to § 27.
Id. at 175.
54 The Court construed § 27 as follows:
The effect of § 27, in protecting state laws from supersedure, is limited to
laws as to the control, appropriation, use or distribution of water in irriga-
tion or for municipal or other uses of the same nature. It therefore has
primary, if not exclusive reference to such proprietary rights. The phrase
'any vested right acquired therein' further emphasizes the application of
the section to property rights. There is nothing in the paragraph to sug-
gest a broader scope unless it be the words 'other pses.' Those words,
however, are confined to rights of the same nature as those relating to the
use of water in irrigation or for municipal purposes."
Id. at 175-76. The Court in California v. FERC stated that this narrow con-
struction of § 27 is not dicta, because the Court's analysis complemented and
was necessary to the Court's holding regarding the scope of § 9(b). See Califor-
nia v. FERC, 495 U.S. at 501-03.
To be sure, the Court's interpretation strongly protects state proprietary
rights in water. See Whittaker, supra note 5, at 162 (noting that in First Iowa,
"[t]he Court construed section 27 as an explicit protection of the states' water
appropriation laws, and would not allow the FPC to be a 'substitute for the
local authorities having jurisdiction over such questions as the sufficiency of the
legal title of the applicant to its riparian rights"') (footnotes omitted). Some
commentators have argued, however, that the Court's decision was improperly
narrow in defining the types of rights that may be considered state proprietary
rights, including the right to control diversions of water. See Whittaker, supra
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The Court therefore read section 9(b) to require that appli-
cants provide information only about compliance with state laws
that are saved pursuant to the limited terms of section 27. "This
makes § 9(b) a natural place in which to describe the evidence
which the Commission shall require in order to pass upon appli-
cations for federal licenses. This makes it a correspondingly un-
natural place to establish by implication such a substantive policy
as that contained in § 27."55 Section 9(b) does not itself preserve
the applicability of any state law to a federal hydropower pro-
ject.5 6 The Court found that this narrow view of section 9(b) was
confirmed by the fact that Congress had rejected a different ver-
sion of this provision that would have expressly authorized states
to decide whether to permit hydropower projects.
If it had been the wish of Congress to make the applicant ob-
tain consent of state, as well as federal authorities to each pro-
ject, the simple thing would have been to so provide. In the
course of the long debate on the legislation it was proposed at
one time to provide for some such a consent in § 9(b).
57
The Court also concluded that its narrow reading of the provision
was consistent with the purpose of the FPA, which is to provide
for a comprehensive, uniform regulatory system that will permit
note 5, at 163-64 ("The Court would have been more conceptually consistent
had it placed the 'diversion' law within the 'water usage' jurisdiction reserved to
the states in section 27, rather than within the FPC's 'construction and opera-
tion' jurisdiction under section 9(b).") (footnote omitted); Kirsch & Seitz, supra
note 20, at 10,441 ("The Court in First Iowa failed to recognize that states often
issue water rights subject to conditions and regulatory controls, including the
place, rate, and time of water diversion and return.").
55 First Iowa, 328 U.S. at 177.
56 Commentators have recognized that the Court's interpretation effectively
gives the Commission the authority to decide whether it will require a showing
of compliance with particular state requirements:
According to the Court, section 9(b) authorized, but did not require the
FPC to demand of its applicants satisfactory evidence of compliance with
state laws. Thus, First Iowa did not interpret the FPA to categorically
preempt state laws; rather, it authorized selective preemption at the dis-
cretion of the FPC.
Blumm, supra note 8, at 119 (footnote omitted). Other authors reached a simi-
lar conclusion:
[T]he purpose of § 9 is best seen as largely informational: FERC licensing
decisions should be based on knowledge of state regulatory requirements
so that its decision to disregard or to require complidnce with state law
will be an informed one. FERC may decide to disregard state law .... but
§ 9 requires that decision to be an informed one.
Kirsch & Seitz, supra note 20, at 10,440 (footnote omitted).
57 First Iowa, 328 U.S. at 178-79.
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the orderly development of hydropower. In the Court's view, the
construction of the Act argued by Iowa would have produced a
disorderly, nonuniform system that was not intended by
Congress.58
In sum, notwithstanding that a natural reading of the FPA
would result in narrow preemption of state laws, the Court con-
cluded that the FPA gave the federal licensing agency paramount
authority and allowed the states to continue to enforce only
property laws.
4. The Amendment and Recent Supreme Court Reaffirmation
of the Broad Preemptive Effect of the FPA
Congress amended the FPA when it enacted the Electric
Consumers Protection Act of 1986 (ECPA) and gave FERC ex-
press authority to consider the impacts that a proposed dam will
have on "fish and wildlife (including related spawning grounds
and habitat) affected by the development, operation, and man-
agement of the project."5 9 Congress amended the FPA to modify
the procedures for FERC review of hydropower license applica-
58 The Court concluded that:
[S]ection [9(b)] ... provides for presentation of information to the federal
commission and protects the constitutional rights of the States. This ex-
planation does not support the contention of the State of Iowa that § 9(b)
amounts to the subjection of the federal license to requirements of the
state law on the same subject. The inappropriateness of such an interpre-
tation is apparent in the light of the circumstances which culminated in
the passage of the Federal Water Power Act in 1920. The purposes of the
Act were then so generally known as to have made such a restrictive in-
terpretation impossible and a denial of it unnecessary. It was the out-
growth of a widely supported effort of the conservationists to secure
enactment of a complete scheme of national regulation which would pro-
mote the comprehensive development of the water resources of the Na-
tion, in so far as it was within the reach of the federal power to do so,
instead of the piecemeal, restrictive, negative approach of the River and
Harbor Acts and other federal laws previously enacted.
Id. at 179-80. See also id. at 181 ("The detailed provisions of the Act providing
for the federal plan of regulation leave no room or need for conflicting state
controls.") (footnote omitted); Blumm, supra note 8, at 119 ("There has never
really been a satisfactory explanation for the First Iowa Court's willingness to
find preemption despite statutory text and legislative history apparently saving
state laws. The Iowa statute at issue seemed to the Court to threaten to veto a
large public power project for minimal state gain.") (footnote omitted). Inter-
estingly, a commentator noted that the broad federal role defined by the Court
was "apparently even broader than the role with which members of the Federal
Power Commission felt comfortable." Plouffe, supra note 41, at 837.
59 16 U.S.C. § 8030)(1) (1994).
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tions and imposed new conditions on FERC licenses. The
amended FPA provides that any hydropower project licensed by
FERC must itself be judged by FERC to "be best adapted to a
comprehensive plan for imlproving or developing a waterway" for
several purposes, including "the adequate protection, mitigation,
and enhancement of fish and wildlife" and "other beneficial uses,
including ... recreational" uses.60 Ensuring consistency with a
comprehensive plan was intended to promote protection of water
resources and quality.61
The amended section 10 of the Act underscores this compre-
hensive planning requirement by mandating that FERC consult
with expert state and federal officials having authority over fish
and wildlife resources.62 This required consultation was intended
to yield better-informed and thus more-balanced decisions re-
garding effects on natural resources. 63 In addition to this consul-
tation, the comprehensive planning requirement was further
strengthened by the Act's mandate that FERC include in its is-
sued licenses conditions that are necessary to protect a water-
60 16 U.S.C. § 803(a)(1) (1994). See also Kirsch & Seitz, supra note 20, at
10,439 ("FERC must impose conditions on every license for a hydroelectric
project to ensure that its operations are consistent with a comprehensive plan
for multiple use of federally regulated waterways.") (footnote omitted).
61 See Plouffe, supra note 41, at 845. Plouffe examines the balancing aspect
of § 10(a):
The comprehensive plan requirement appears to be an expression of Con-
gress's intent that the FERC balance claims on river resources. These
claims often conflict in hydropower licensing decisions, and a comprehen-
sive plan requirement prevents the FERC from simply licensing any pro-
ject that will maximize the river's megawatt potential without considering
the river's nonpower resources as well. If plans to mitigate environmental
damage cannot protect especially significant nonpower resources, section
10(a) seems to contemplate denial of the license.
Plouffe, supra note 41, at 845 (footnote omitted).
See 16 U.S.C. § 803(a)(3) (1994) (requiring that FERC "solicit recom-
mendations" from federal and state officials with responsibility over affected
water resources); 16 U.S.C. § 8030)(1) (1994) (requiring that resource-protec-
tion provisions of the hydropower license "be based on recommendations"
from federal and state agencies with expertise on fish and wildlife resource
issues).
6 At Congressional hearings, there was testimony as follows:
[T]he 10J process was created to require that the Commission give due
deference to the expertise and knowledge of expert fish and wildlife agen-
cies like the Fish and Wildlife Service and to generally base the terms and
conditions relating to fish and wildlife on the recommendations it re-
ceived from those agencies.
Hearing, supra note 7, at 58 (testimony of John D. Echeverria, Counsel, Na-
tional Audubon Society).
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way's fish and wildlife.64 In short, when Congress amended the
FPA in 1986, it intended that FERC "pay more attention to envi-
ronmental concerns in deciding whether to issue hydroelectric
project licenses." 65
The Supreme Court had occasion to consider the meaning of
this expanded FERC authority when it returned to the issue of
the preemptive effect of the FPA in 1990. In California v. FERC,
the California Water Resources Control Board had asserted its
authority to require permanent minimum flow rates for a feder-
ally licensed hydropower project different than those prescribed
by FERC.6 6 FERC contended that the state agency's action re-
garding minimum flow rates interfered with FERC's broad au-
thority to license hydropower projects and was inconsistent with
First Iowa.67
Faced with this conflict between state and federal authority,
the Court adhered to its decision in First Iowa and held that the
FPA foreclosed state authority over minimum flow requirements
because those requirements are unrelated to proprietary and re-
lated rights in water.68 The Court found no grounds for declining
to adhere to the strong rule of stare decisis in statutory cases,69
and believed that reliance interests supported judicial adherence
to a prior interpretation of the statute.70 The Court also re-
jected7' an argument that the scope of FPA preemption should
be defined as narrowly as the Court defined the preemptive ef-
fect of the Reclamation Act in California v. United States. In-
64 16 U.S.C. § 803G)(1) (1994).
65 Kirsch & Seitz, supra note 20, at 10,443 (footnote omitted).
66 California v. FERC, 495 U.S. 490, 494-95.
67 Id. at 495-96.
6s Id- at 506. One commentator argued that the Court had, in the years
before 1990, indicated that it was likely to adhere to First Iowa in a F1A case
that raised the preemption issue: See Plouffe, supra note 41, at 842 n.61.
69 California v. FERC, 495 U.S. at 499 ("There has been no sufficient inter-
vening change in the law, or indication that First Iowa has proved unworkable
or has fostered confusion and inconsistency in the law, that warrants our depar-
ture from established precedent.") (citation omitted). For a discussion of the
strong presumption against overruling statutory precedents, see WiU.wLA N.
EsKRIDGE, JR. & PmLIP P. FRICKE-Y, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEOIStATON:
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC Poucy 436-38 (2d ed. 1995).
70 See California v. FERC, 495 U.S. at 500.
71 Id. at 503-05.
72 438 U.S. 645 (1978). The Court stated in California v. FERC that "the
FPA envisioned a considerably broader and more active federal oversight role
in hydropower development than did the Reclamation Act." 495 U.S. at 504
(citation omitted). Commentators agree that, although the preemption lan-
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deed, the Supreme Court inferred from the 1986 amendment to
the FPA that Congress had reaffirmed the "paramount" role of
FERC in the licensing process, including broad authority over
wildlife issues.73
The result, in the Court's view, was that the federal license
requirements have preemptive effect: "[A] federal licensee under
the FPA need not comply with state requirements that conflict
with the federal license provisions established pursuant to the
FPA's directives." 74 The breadth of the Court's analysis in Cali-
fornia v. FERC, although surprising in view of the absence of any
strong rationale by the Court,75 would have suggested that state
water quality standards should not bind FERC's discretion about
the need for and the conditions to be placed on a hydropower
project.7 6 The Court reached its decision, however, in the ab-
sence of any competing federal interest defined by Congress,
such as the requirements of the CWA.77
5. The Impact of the Supreme Court's Broad Reading of FPA
Preemption: The Scope of Retained State Authority
Under the FPA
The result of the Supreme Court's interpretations of the
FPA is a "generally accepted [view] that the pervasive federal
guage in the two statutes is quite similar, the provisions should be construed to
have different effects. See Kirsch & Seitz, supra note 20, at 10,440-41:
While application of the anti-preemption provisions of the Reclamation
Act would not frustrate its very purpose since it is not, at its heart, a regu-
latory statute, guch provisions would frustrate the purpose of the FPA.
Kirsch & Seitz, supra note 20, at 10,441.
73 California v. FERC, 495 U.S. at 499 ("Congress has amended the FPA to
elaborate and reaffirm First Iowa's understanding that the FPA establishes a
broad and paramount federal regulatory role.") (citation omitted). Commenta-
tors have concurred that a reasonable inference of Congress's amendment of
the statute in 1986 is that Congress was "satisf[ied] with the current division of
authority." Kirsch & Seitz, supra note 20, at 10,444.
74 California v. FERC, 495 U.S. at 505.
75 See Blumm, supra note 8, at 125 ("The result in California v. FERC
clearly preempted the state's attempt to set minimum flows higher than those
ordered by FERC. But the Court was not so clear as to the reasoning for and
thus the scope of the preemption.").
76 See California v. FERC, 495 U.S. at 506 ("Allowing California to impose
significantly higher minimum stream flow requirements would disturb and con-
flict with the balance embodied in that considered federal agency
determination.").
77 See PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Dep't of Ecology, 849
P.2d 646, 656 (1993) (distinguishing California v. FERC on this ground).
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scheme has occupied the entire field of hydroelectric power regu-
lation. 78 This scheme necessarily grants broad authority to
FERC, which has acted to exercise that authority to its full ex-
tent,79 despite the fact that states may be embittered by FERC's
exercise of its powers.80
The exception to this broad federal administrative power de-
fined in the FPA and discussed by the Court in its decisions inter-
preting the Act is stated in section 27, which provides that the
Act does not "affect or in any way... interfere with the laws of
the respective States relating to the control, appropriation, use,
or distribution of water used in irrigation or for municipal or
other uses, or any vested right acquired therein."81 Although the
Court has interpreted this provision narrowly,P thus limiting its
effect,8 3 some commentators have suggested that states may rely
on this savings provision to assert control over federal licensing
78 Kirsch & Seitz, supra note 20, at 10,441 (footnote omitted). See also
Plouffe, supra note 41, at 835 ("Today, unless the Court overrules First Iobia,
state laws purporting to allocate river resources to nonpower uses have no legal
force in the face of the Federal Power Act.") (footnote omitted).
79 See Kirsch & Seitz, supra note 20, at 10,442 ("In analyses that belie the
clouded line between §§ 9 and 27, FERC frequently has overruled state at-
tempts to exercise authority over water releases from hydroelectric projects by
holding that the FPA creates an exclusively federal regulatory scheme.") (foot-
note omitted).
S0 One example is the strained relationship between New York and FERC:
The [New York] Department's relationship with [FERC] can best be de-
scribed as extremely formal, convoluted and litigious. The relationship
has degenerated during the past several years, primarily as a result of the
Commission's increased reliance upon the preemptive nature of the Fed-
eral Power Act, as opposed to increased recognition and acceptance of
the Department's expertise in managing New York's resources.
Hearing, supra note 7, at 104-05 (statement of Marc S. Gerstman, Deputy Com-
missioner and General Counsel, Dep't of EnvtL Conservation). One writer has
summarized state complaints about FERC's licensing of small hydropower
projects. See Whittaker, supra note 5, at 142-43. These complaints principally
focus on FERC's lack of interest in comprehensive planning for and the cumu-
lative impacts of hydropower projects, a lack of concern about state water law,
and a failure to cooperate with states. See Whittaker, supra note 5, at 14243;
Hearing, supra note 7, at 101 ("[FERC] has not been according the States' ex-
pertise in managing its [sic] natural resources appropriate deference in the Fed-
eral licensing process.").
81 16 U.S.C. § 821 (1994).
82 See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
83 One commentator has noted-
[W]hile the FPA does not occupy the field and void all state water laws, it
does enable FERC to selectively preempt state requirements that it
deems inconsistent with a particular licensing decision. California v.
FERC, in other words, interprets the FPA to delegate preemptive author-
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authority by redefining proprietary rights in water so that a pro-
posed project becomes infeasible. 4 This strategy is unlikely to be
appealing to states because courts may hold it unlawful under the
FPA,85 or it may yield at best a right to compensation, rather
than an unimpaired waterway.8
6
In sum, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, the FPA
broadly preempts state law and delegates to FERC extensive
power to license a hydropower project, in spite of state concerns
about local impacts.
ity to FERC on a case-by-case basis. The only exception is section 27's
saving of state laws under which existing 'proprietary' rights were created.
Blumm, supra note 8, at 126 (footnote omitted). See also Kirsch & Seitz, supra
note 20, at 10,442 (footnotes omitted) who note that:
Although states also have an interest in protecting inchoate proprietary
rights, courts consistently have referred to § 27's savings clause as
designed to protect only vested rights. There is no indication that § 27 is
designed to protect rights for which no compensation would be available
under the takings clause of the U.S. Constitution.
84-One suggestion to resolve states' complaints regarding FERC is as
follows:
[T]he answer to state complaints that FERC sets illegal minimum in-
stream flows for its projects is that states should enforce their own laws,
allowing only such appropriation as is consistent with the desired level of
instream flow. Likewise, the states can protect future upstream develop-
ment by granting water rights of limited duration or only issuing hydro-
power developers subordinated water rights.
Whittaker, supra note 5, at 183. See also Blumm, supra note 8, at 126 ("Since
states have the authority to define the nature of proprietary rights, nothing in
the FPA would preclude a state from establishing minimum streamflows as pro-
prietary rights. Thus, the 'proprietary rights' exception may enable states like
Oregon to demand compensation from FERC licensees if their minimum flows
are disturbed.") (footnotes omitted). Cf. Kirsch & Seitz, supra note 20, at
10,438 (in discussing California v. FERC, the authors state that "the Court's
resolution of the [preemption] issue-largely if not entirely in FERC's favor-
leaves open questions about FERC's authority over water allocation
decisions").
85 See Blumm, supra note 8, at 125 ("Given the Court's concern over not
allowing the states to veto FERC licenses, a state that denies a water right to a
project is very likely to find its authority preempted if FERC decides to license
the project without the state right.") (footnote omitted).
86 See Blumn, supra note 8, at 129. Blumm states that:
[B]ecause the FPA authorizes FERC licensees to condemn water rights, it
may be that the effect of interfering with an Oregon-like streamflow is to
enable the state to receive just compensation for the taking, rather than
block an unwanted project. Apart from the difficulties of valuing the lost
public property right, states may find monetary payments from licensees
an inadequate surrogate for regulatory authority. In short, the "proprie-
tary exception" to FERC preemptive authority under California v. FERC
is not likely to make states less interested in amending the statute.
d. (footnote omitted).
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B. FERC's Limited Accommodation of Environmental
Interests When Exercising Its Powers Under the FPA
As one commentator has noted, the effect of the decision in
California v. FERC was that, at least with regard to federal au-
thority under the FPA, "[t]he prospects for environmental pro-
tection will depend almost entirely on how FERC accepts its
environmental watchdog role under ECPA generally."87 Indeed,
the Supreme Court's decisions giving broad preemptive power to
the FPA might not have been so disconcerting to environmental-
ists if FERC had itself used its statutory authority to protect the
ecology. and water quality of the rivers and streams used to gen-
erate hydropower.
FERC has not, however, exercised its authority in that way.
Various concerned observers, including state officials, 3 federal
officials,8 9 members of Congress, 90 environmentalists, 91 and
scholars, 2 have concluded that FERC either uniformly or in par-
87 Kirsch & Seitz, supra note 20, at 10,447.
88 See Hearing, supra note 7, at 99 (statement of Marc S. Gerstman, Deputy
Commissioner and General Counsel, New York Dep't of EnvtL Conservation)
("In New York we perceive the Commission to be maximizing power genera-
tion at the expense of environmental protection measures. This shift away from
a more equitable balanced approach to decisionnaking has become evident
during the past several years.").
89 Hearing, supra note 7, at 119 (statement of Russell Earnest, Deputy As-
"sistant Director for Fish and Wildlife Enhancement, Fish and Wildlife Service,
U.S. Dep't of the Interior) ("Overall there is a problem in terms of fish and
wildlife values getting equal consideration [by FERC] with other project
benefits.").
90 Hearing, supra note 7, at 199 (statement of Rep. Sam Gejdenson) (-In
recent years .... it has become increasingly clear that FERC favors the develop-
ment of all hydroelectric projects regardless of their potential negative impacts
on natural resources. More importantly, FERC seems to completely ignore the
concerns of the state and local governments and the local community.").
91 See Hearing, supra note 7, at 35 (statement of John D. Echeverria, Coun-
. sel, National Audubon Society) ("[T]he Commission and its staff are biased in
favor of development interests and indifferent to or flatly hostile to other val-
ues, particularly the wildlife and other concerns of greatest interest to National
Audubon and other conservation groups."); Hearing, supra note 7, at 203
(statement of F. Lorraine Bodi, Co-Director, Northwest Regional Office,
American Rivers, Inc.) (judging from her 13 years of experience with FERC,
she "consider[s] FERC's handling of fish, wildlife, and recreation issues to be
abysmal.").
92 See e.g., Blumm, supra note 8, at 130 n.105 ("[A]Ithough the FPA calls for
balaftced and multiple use of streamflows, the FERC licensing process can pro-
duce results that are heavily biased toward applicant visions of economic viabil-
ity at the expense of fish and wildlife protection.") (citation omitted). See also
Blumm, supra note. 8, at 130 ("A number of recent studies confirm FERC's
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ticular proceedings favors developing hydropower over prevent-
ing or minimizing adverse environmental impacts. Although
FERC rejects such conclusions on the grounds that they reflect
an undue concern with the environment and an insufficient rec-
ognition of the broader public interest that FERC must ulti-
mately serve,93 the conclusions seem well founded when one
considers the difference between the theory of FERC's review of
fish and wildlife impacts and FERC's actual practice.
As noted above, when Congress amended the FPA in 1986 it
intended that FERC would act to protect the eQosystem of rivers
and streams used to produce power. The theory was that expert
state and federal wildlife protection agencies would have an op-
portunity to recommend conditions that FERC should impose on
its licensees in order to protect fish and wildlife on waterways.9 4
As amended, however, the FPA does not require that FERC ac-
cept all recommendations about the conditions needed to protect
consistent willingness to favor maximizing hydroelectric revenues at the ex-
pense of fish and wildlife protection.") (footnote omitted).
93 See Hearing, supra note 7, at 172-73 where the Chairman of FERC
testified:
[T]he legislative mandates of resource agencies are often limited in scope,
such as the protection of fish and wildlife or of anadromous ,fish. Such
agencies have no responsibility to evaluate a project in light of the many
public interest factors encompassed by the comprehensive development
standard of Section 10(a) of the FPA.
Hearing, supra note 7, at 172-73 (statement of Martin Allday, Chairman,
FERC). He further elaborated:
Because fish passage measures can be very expensive in terms of capital
costs and reduction of power generation, they can determine the eco-
nomic viability of a project. Thus, the Secretary would, in many cases,
have de facto veto authority over the licensing decision, and ultimate con-
trol over project operations, but with no requirement to give equal con-
sideration to developmental values, as the Commission is required to do
by Section 4(e) of the FPA.
Hearing, supra note 7, at 177 (statement of Martin Allday, Chairman, FERC).
94 See Kirsch & Seitz, supra note 20, at 10,445 (footnotes omitted). These
commentators have noted:
[U]nder ECPA, FERC has an affirmative statutory obligation to impose
conditions on the operations of hydropower projects that are necessary
for the 'protection, mitigation, and enhancement' of fish and wildlife
habitat. Both the language of the statute and its legislative history leave
no doubt that FERC must exercise its authority to require such conditions
upon recommendation from state and federal wildlife agencies.
See also Blumm, supra note 8, at 128 ("[States] may submit recommended flows
to FERC under section 100) of the FPA, and, based on these recommendations,
FERC must include in its licenses conditions that will 'adequately and equitably
protect, mitigate damages to, and enhance' fish, wildlife, and habitat.") (foot-
note omitted).
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fish and wildlife resources; it is only required to explain why it
has rejected any conditions that are not included in the license
and how the license as issued will ensure sufficient protection for
,fish and wildlife.95
FERC's practice in implementing these section 10(j) re-
quirements has been the subject of considerable controversy.
The provision includes one express and one implied requirement.
The express requirement is, of course, that FERC licenses in-
elude conditions sufficient to protect fish and other ,ildlife. The
implied requirement is that FERC demand that applicants sub-
mit sufficient information about the impacts of the proposed pro-
ject on fish and wildlife to permit the state and federal wildlife
agencies to decide the conditions that are needed to ensure pro-
tection of these resources. Federal and state actors involved with
the section 10() consultation process believe that FERC has
failed in complying with both of these requirements.
First, interested agencies claim that FERC has not required
the submission of information needed to identify conditions for
the protection of fish and wildlife.96 Needed information often
can be gained only by one or more studies undertaken by the
applicant over a period of time,97 and the expertise of wildlife
95 16 U.S.C. § 8030)(2) (1994). See also Kirsch & Seitz, supra note 20, at
10,444 ("FERC generally must adopt license conditions based on recommenda-
tions it receives from state and federal fish and wildlife agencies, but it has the
discretion to reject recommendations under certain circumstances."); Hearing,
supra note 7, at 151 (statement of Martin L. Ailday, Chairman, FERC) ("If,
after [section 10(j)] negotiations, the Commission does not adopt a recommen-
dation, it must explain why the agency recommendation is inconsistent with the
law, and why the Commission's alternative adequately addresses fish and wild-
life issues.").
96 See Hearing, supra note 7, at 77 (statement of Michael TiIman, Deputy
Assistant Administrator for Fisheries, National Marine Fisheries Service
(NMFS), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Dep't of
Commerce) ("In our view, FERC has not always required applicants to provide
the scientific data we consider necessary to evaluate project impacts on fishery
resources and which we have requested be made available."); Hearing, supra
note 7, at 123-25 (statement of Nicholas E. Iadanza, supervisory fish biologist.
Chief, Habit Conservation Branch, U.S. Dep't of Commerce) (providing exam-
ples of hydropower licensing cases in which, in the view of FWS, FERC issued
licenses without first having required and received sufficient information about
ecological impacts).
97 For example:
Under the FWCA, the FPA, and the Northwest Power Act, for example,
NMFS consults with FERC applicants prior to licensing in order to deter-
mine studies necessary to identify measures to protect, mitigate, enhance
anadromous fishery resources and their habitat. After all necessary data
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agencies holds no value when they have no data, or insufficient
data, to rely upon in defining needed conditions.98
Regarding section 10(j)'s express requirement that a license
include necessary protective conditions, interested agencies also
criticize FERC's decisions about whether to include recom-
mended conditions in the licenses it issues. Indeed, the Fish and
Wildlife Service has argued that FERC has improperly narrowed
the range of recommendations that it is willing to consider from
resource agencies.99 Although FERC maintains that it accepts re-
source agency recommendations in more than ninety percent of
all cases,100 resource agencies contend that FERC improperly ig-
nores some recommendations,10' and fails to protect resources
are gathered, NMFS submits its recommended license conditions for fish
protection, mitigation, and enhancement, pursuant to Section 10(j) of the
EPA.
Hearing, supra note 7, at 77 (statement of Michael Tillman, U.S. Dep't of
Commerce).
98 See Hearing, supra note 7, at 77 (statement of Michael Tillman, U.S.
Dep't of Commerce) ("In ... cases [where FERC does not require needed
scientific information, NMFS is] unable to provide scientifically based recom-
mendations regarding the protection of [fishery] resources in connection with
the hydropower projects involved in the licensing proceeding.").
99 For example, the Fish and Wildlife Service believes:
[T]he Commission incorrectly defined 'fish and wildlife recommendation,'
subject to special consultation requirements of Section 10(j) of the Fed-
eral Power Act, to exclude requests that proposed projects not be con-
structed or operated. The Service also believes the final rule
inappropriately precludes recommendations under section 10(j) for addi-
tional or amended license conditions to protect fishery resources in cir-
cumstances where post-licensing studies and consultations would be
conducted.
Hearing, supra note 7, at 72 (statement of Russell Earnest, Deputy Assistant
Director for Fish and Wildlife Enhancement, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service,
Dep't of the Interior).
100 See Hearing, supra note 7, at 133 (statement of Martin L. Allday, Chair-
man, FERC) ("Since section 10(j) was added to the FPA in 1986, the Commis-
sion has received over 1,900 fish and wildlife recommendations. The
acceptance rate is between 90 and 95 percent."). But see id. at 188 (statement
of Fred E. Springer, Director, Office of Hydropower Licensing, FERC) ("Of
the 48 cases involving 10(j) negotiations, the Commission did not accept all the
fish and wildlife recommendations in 19 cases.").
101 See Hearing, supra note 7, at 214 (statement of F. Lorraine Bodi, Co-
Director, Northwest Regional Office, American Rivers, Inc.) ("FERC considers
section 10G) recommendations to be inconsistent with applicable law if they
differ from its own balancing of the public interest under section 10(a). This is
such a broad reading of ECPA that it allows FERC to reject agency recommen-
dations whenever it chooses.").
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adequately in cases where the agency does consider the
recommendations.102
Because the resource agencies believe that the section 10(j)
consultation process has not yielded sufficient protection of fish
and wildlife, these agencies have sought to rely on the certifica-
tion requirement of section 401 of the CWA.10 3 It is to this re-
quirement, and the decisions of state courts interpreting it in the
context of FERC licensing, that this Article now turns.
C. The CWA and the Role of States and Their Water Quality
Standards Under the CWA
1. The Function of Water Quality Standards (WQSs) Under
the CWA' °4
The basic regulatory structure now established by the CWA
was first enacted by Congress in the Federal Water Pollution
Control Amendments (FWPCA) of 1972.105 In that 1972 Act,
Congress substantially revised the nation's approach to water
pollution control, which had previously been defined by the
Water Quality Act of 1965.105 The 1965 Act had relied principally
102 See Hearing, supra note 7, at 58-59 (statement of John D. Echeverria,
Counsel, National Audubon Society). Regarding the impact of Section 10(j)
recommendations:
IT]he 10 percent [FERC] ha[s] rejected are very important. And the 90
percent they say they have accepted, they haven't accepted. What they
have done is covered it... Basically what the 10J process has been re-
duced to is a paper exercise. You go through a process of getting recom-
mendations from the agency, the Commission reads them, if it doesn't
agree with them it has to document why it doesn't agree.
Id
103 See Hearing, supra note 7, at 100 (statement of Marc S. Gerstman, Dep-
uty Commissioner and General Counsel, New York Dep't of EnvtL Conserva-
tion) (in the case of three operating, but unlicensed projects, "[t]he Commission
found that [Department of Environmental Conservation] and U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service recommendations were unreasonable and based its conclusion
upon lost power that could be attributed to implementing these measures.
Again, fortunately only through the [section 401] water quality certificate was
DEC able to assure the resource protection.").
104 A much more detailed discussion of the role that state water quality
standards play under the CWA is presented in Jeffrey M. Gaba, Federal
Supervision of State Water Quality Standards Under the Clean Water Act, 36
VAD. L. R.v. 1167 (1983).
105 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq.
106 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1165 omitted as superseded by Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 2
(1972).
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on state-established WQSs to define the clean water goals and
standards for waters regulated under the Act.l07
When the 1965 Act proved to be ineffective in controlling
water pollution, 08 Congress decided to shift from the WQS-
based system for regulating the nation's waters to a system based
on required effluent limits on sources of pollution.109 The regula-
tory scheme adopted in 1972 sought to improve water quality pri-
marily by limiting discharges into regulated waters and setting a
goal of zero discharge of pollutants."10 Congress decided, how-
ever, that it did not wish to abandon entirely WQS-based regula-
tion in the 1972 Act. Congress accordingly included a provision
for the defining of WQSs by states (followed by federal review
and approval)"' and provided that WQSs would serve as a sup-
plementary limit on the pollution of a waterway.1' 2 That is, dis-
charges would have to remain below the applicable emissions
limit, unless a more stringent limit were needed to ensure com-
pliance with an applicable WQS." 3 This additional impact of
WQSs has great potential significance because the quality of
many of the nation's waters fails to meet the applicable WQSs. 114
107 FREDERICK ANDERSON ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECnION: LAW AN)
POLICY 354 (2d ed. 1990) ("The heart of the 1965 Act's regulatory program was
water quality standards.").
108 See id. at 354-55.
109 See S. REP. No. 92-414 at 1236 (1971), 92d Cong., reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3675 (accompanying the 1972 FWPCA) ("The legislation
recommended by the Committee proposes a major change in the enforcement
mechanism of the Federal water pollution control program from water quality
standards to effluent limits.").
110 See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 107, at 355-56.
'I' See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A) (1995). For each standard, eithqr revised
or adopted by a state:
[WQSs] shall be such as to protect the public health or welfare, enhance
the quality of water and serve the purposes of this [Act]. Such standards
shall be established taking into consideration their use and value for pub-
lic water supplies, propagation of fish and wildlife, recreational purposes,
and agricultural, industrial, and other purposes, and also taking into con-
sideration their use and value for navigation.
Id.
112- 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C) (1994).
113 See Keating v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 927 F.2d 616, 622
(D.C. Cir. 1991) ("The states remain, under the Clean Water Act, the 'prime
bulwark in the effort to abate water pollution,' and Congress expressly empow-
ered them to impose and enforce water quality standards that are more strin-
gent than those required by federal law.") (citations omitted).
114 See H.R. REP. No. 1095, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 213 (1992). The CWA set
lofty goals but they have not all been met:
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In the years since the shift to an effluent-control based sys-
tem of regulation, Congress has reaffirmed that WQSs neverthe-
less play an important and enhanced role in controlling water
pollution. Thus, the Water Quality Act of 1987 sought to im-
prove the control of toxic water pollution by requiring compli-
ance with more specific, numerical water quality criteria,ls and
by requiring that states develop "individual control strategies"
,for waters that fail to comply with those numerical criteria for
toxic pollutants." 6 Congress also codified in the 1987 Act the
policy that EPA had developed to prevent degradation of water
quality.117 That policy is intended to ensure the maintenance of
water quality sufficient to support existing uses.1 s In sum,
although the CWA has focused on requiring effluent limits on
At the time of its enactment in 1972, the Clean Water Act set a goal of
assuring fishable and swimmable waters throughout the Nation by 194
and eliminating the discharge of pollutants by 1985. Today, approximately
30 percent of all assessed river miles fail to attain fully designated water
quality standards. Twenty-five percent of lakes are impaired and 29 per-
cent of estuaries similarly do not meet designated water quality standards.
Id. A Senate Committee reported similarly poor results:
About 30 percent of the Nation's rivers and streams did not meet water
quality standards. Twenty percent of lakes were impaired and 25 percent
identified as threatened. Fully 92 percent of the shoreline miles of the
Great Lakes were not meeting water quality standards. The scientific
community identified significant impairments to the ecological integrity of
waterbodies, mostly as a result of nonpoint sources of pollution.
S. REP. No. 33, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1993).
1 See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(B) (1995); R. CoNF. REP. No. 1004, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 129 (1986):
Subsection (d) requires that during State review, revision, or adoption of
water quality standards, the State must adopt criteria for all priority tode
pollutants for which water quality criteria have been published under sec-
tion 304(a). The State's criteria are to be based on specific numerical cri-
teria. Where numerical criteria are not available, the State shall use
biological monitoring or assessment methods.
Id. See also H.R. RE-P. No. 839, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 72 (1992):
It is also the Committee's intent that groundwater should be protected to
ensure that groundwater that is closely hydrologically connected to sur-
face waters does not interfere with the attainment of surface water quality
standards, which is necessary to protect the integrity of associated ecosys-
tems. The beneficial uses will be determined under applicable state law,
and may include, but are not limited to, agricultural, industrial, commer-
cial, and drinking water uses.
Id. Congress also amended the CWA in 1977. Those amendments modified
significantly the technology-based regulatory scheme but "left the water quality
standards program unchanged." See Gaba, supra note 104, at 1186.
116 33 U.S.C. § 1314(1)(1)(D) (1994).
117 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(4)(B) (1994).
118 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a)(1) (1995).
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sources of pollution as the most important means for protecting
the nation's waters, the Act continues to recognize that state
WQSs play an important supplementary role in protecting and
enhancing the quality of those waters.
2. The Content of State WQSs
EPA regulations provide that state WQSs must include three
core elements to comply with the CWA.119 The standards must
include "[u]se designations ' for waters subject to the Act,120
"[w]ater quality criteria sufficient to protect the designated
uses,"'121 and an acceptable "antidegradation policy."1 22
EPA regulations relating to the states' designation of uses
give the states the authority to define those uses within certain
constraints. 2 3 For example, the regulations foreclose uses that
would allow plainly unhealthy levels and discharges of pollutants
into waters. 2 4 The regulations also ensure that designated uses
are at least as protective of water quality as existing uses.125 A
state's designated uses are relevant to hydropower projects be-
cause of the modifications in waterways that may result from
those projects. 126
19 40 iC.F.R. § 131.6 (1995). See also Hearing, supra note 7, at 92, where an
EPA official stated that:
EPA regulations .. require States to adopt standards with three basic
components. First, the States are to designate the uses it wishes [sic] to
protect for each of its waters.... Second, the State is to adopt criteria to
protect those uses. Criteria may be numeric or narrative and may relate
to chemical, biological or physical characteristics of the water. Finally, the
State must adopt an antidegradation policy to protect its high quality wa-
ters. EPA regulations direct that wherever the goal is attainable, States
must strive to achieve fishable/swimmable water quality ....
See Hearing, supra note 7, at 92 (statement of Martha G. Prothro, Deputy As-
sistant Administrator, Office of Water, EPA).
120 40"C.F.R. § 131.6(a) (1995).
121 40 C.F.R. § 131.6(c) (1995).
122 40 C.F.R. § 131.6(d) (1995).
123 40 C.F.R. § 131.10 (1995).
124 40 C.F.R. § 131.10(a) (1995) ("In no case shall a State adopt waste trans-
port or waste assimilation as a designated use.").
125 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 131.10(g)-(h) (1995).
126 See Hearing, supra note 7, at 93 (statement of Martha G. Prothro, Deputy
Assistant Administrator, Office of Water, EPA) ("Water quality standards are
usually designed to protect biological resources. Hydromodification may result
in standards violations, if for example, a flowing stream turns into a reservoir
changing the biological community that previously existed, thereby in manner
inconsistent with the designated use.").
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Water quality criteria are defined by the state and reviewed
by EPA on the basis of the uses designated by the state.127 The
criteria are required to "represent[] a quality of water that sup-
ports a particular use. When criteria are met, water quality will
generally protect the designated use."123 The criteria may be "ex-
pressed as constituent concentrations, levels, or narrative state-
ments."129 In recent years, EPA has shown an increased interest
in strengthening the water quality criteria adopted by states to
promote greater protection of water resources and the biologic
resources that depend on those waters. For example, following
the lead of certain states, EPA has encouraged other states to
develop new water quality criteria that will ensure protection of
the ecosystems that depend on the regulated watenvay.13 0 Water
quality criteria may, of course, be implicated by a proposed hy-
dropower project.
The third core element, an antidegradation policy, must
meet minimum requirements established by EPA regulations,
31
including the full protection of existing uses132 and "high quality
waters constitut[ing] an outstanding National resource,"1 33 and
the more limited protection of other waters whose quality ex-
ceeds the level needed to protect existing uses.13 The an-
tidegradation element of the WQSs may also be very important
in considering the effects of hydropower projects, because WQSs
designed to prevent antidegradation may foreclose the modifica-
tions to a water's existing ecosystem that would result from con-
struction of a dam.135
127 40 C.F.R. § 131.11(a)(1) (1995) ("States must adopt those water quality
criteria that protect the designated use.").
128 40 C.F.R. § 131.3(b) (1995).
129 40 CF.R. § 131.3(b) (1995).
130 For example, Martha G. Prothro testified that:
EPA has recently begun to emphasize that States should also include
more specific criteria for habitat protection, criteria to help prevent con-
tamination of sediments and criteria for the protection of wildlife. Some
States are way ahead of us on this and we are using them as examples for
other States to move forward.
Hearing, supra note 7, at 88 (statement of Martha G. Prothro, Deputy Assistant
Administrator, Office of Water, EPA).
131 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a) (1995).
132 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a)(1) (1995).
133 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a)(3) (1995).
134 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a)(2) (1995).
135 For example, an EPA official offered the following testimony.
State antidegradation policies are an integral part of water quality stan-
dards and are therefore an integral part of State section 401 certifications.
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In sum, as applied by EPA at present, state WQSs include a
range of elements that may broadly protect the quality of a
state's waters.1 3
6
3. The CWA Section 401 Certification Requirement
In addition to retaining WQS-based regulation, the 1972
FWPCA made federal licensing dependent on compliance with a
state's WQSs. Section 401(a) of the Act provides that, before a
federal license may be issued, a state must certify that the license
applicant will not cause a violation of the state's WQSs. 137 Sec-
These antidegradation policies could give States the ability to prevent, for
example, the changing of a trout stream into a reservoir that would sup-
port different uses, such as habitat for carp and catfish.
Hearing, supra note 7, at 93-94 (statement of Martha G. Prothro, Deputy Assis-
tant Administrator, Office of Water, EPA).
136 See Hearing, supra note 7, at 95. Ms. Prothro testified:
Protecting water quality means protecting the entire aquatic system in-
cluding aquatic life, wildlife, wetlands and other habitats, vegetation and
hydrologic conditions. Toxicity and bioaccumulation of pollutants, the di-
versity and composition of aquatic species, entrapment of pollutants in
sediment, significant changes in temperature, stormwater and other
nonpoint source impacts, habitat loss and degradation, and hydrologic
changes are all relevant water quality issues,
Hearing, supra note 7, at 95. Ms. Prothro further stated:
[I]t is our position that the CleanWater Act is clearly designed to protect
biological, chemical and physical integrity of the Nation's waters. Even
though EPA and the States have focused in recent years on many water
chemistry kinds of issues, the Act is not restricted to these, and, in fact,
State water quality standards are inadequate if they address only water
chemistry.
Hearing, supra note 7, at 128 (emphasis added).
137 Section 401(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (1994), states that:
(1) Any applicant for a Federal license or permit to conduct any activity
including, but not limited to, the construction or operation of facilities,
which may result in any discharge into the navigable waters, shall provide
the licensing or permitting agency a certification from the State in which
the discharge originates or will originate, or, if appropriate, from the in-
terstate water pollution control agency having jurisdiction over the navi-
gable waters at the point where the discharge originates or will originate,
I that any such discharge will comply with the applicable provisions of sec-
tions 301, 302, 303, 306, and 307 of this Act., In the case of any such activ-
ity for which there is not an applicable effluent limitation or other
limitation under sections 301 and 302, and there is not an applicable stan-
dard under sections 306 and 307, the State shall so certify .... In any case
where a State or interstate agency has no authority to give such a certifi-
cation, such certification shall be from the Administrator. If the State,
interstate agency, or Administrator as the case may be, fails or refuses to
act on a request for certification, within a reasonable period of time
(which shall not exceed one year) after receipt of such request, the certifi-
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tion 401(d) reinforces this state certification authority by provid-
ing that a state may add conditions to a federal license that are
needed to ensure compliance with its WQSs. 13s Consistent with
the CWA's emphasis on state authority to establish requirements
that are more stringent than the requirements imposed under
federal law,' 39 section 401(d) conditions may be framed so as to
ensure that WQSs more rigorous than federal standards will not
be violated. 40 Federal agencies may not overrule these condi-
cation requirements of this subsection shall be waived with respect to such
Federal application. No license or permit shall be granted until the certifi-
cation required by this section has been obtained or has been waived as
provided in the preceding sentence. No license or permit shall be granted
if certification has been denied by the State, interstate agency, or the Ad-
ministrator, as the case may be.
See also Keating v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 927 F.2d 616, 622
(D.C. Cir. 1991) ("Through this [certification] requirement, Congress intended
that the states would retain the power to block, for environmental reasons, local
water projects that might otherwise win federal approval.") (citations omitted).
138 33 U.S.C. § 1341(d) (1994). A state certifying agency may place condi-
tions on a section 401 certification when
necessary to assure that any applicant for a Federal license or permit will
comply with any applicable effluent limitations and other limitations,
under section 1311 or 1312 of this title, standard of performance under
section 1316 of this title, or prohibition, effluent standard, or pretreatment
standard under section 1317 of this title, and with any other appropriate
requirement of State law set forth in such certification ....
Id. See also Keating, 927 F.2d at 623 ("When states make compliance with spec-
ified conditions a prerequisite to the effectiveness of a certification, the federal
Government has been prepared to enforce those conditions.") (citations omit-
ted). One commentator has stated:
Under this decision, if a state legislature or a state agency prohibits or sets
conditions on a proposed hydro project, and if the state's water quality
agency includes those requirements in its § 401 water quality certification,
those conditions are binding on FERC and must become part of the
FERC license. These conditions need not be directly related to mainte-
nance of water qttality standards, although the state's case will be even
stronger if they are.
Arnold, supra note 167, at 10,141 (discussing Roosevelt Campobello Int'l Park
Comm'n v. EPA, 684 F.2d 1041 (1st Cir. 1982).
139 See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C) (1994).
140 See S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 69 (1971), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3735, in which the Committee stated that Section 401
makes clear that any water quality requirements established under State
law, more stringent that those requirements established under this Act
also shall through certification become conditions on any Federal license
or permit. The purpose of the certification mechanism provided in this
law is to assure that Federal licensing or permitting agencies cannot over-
ride State water quality requirements.
Id.
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tions, even though the licensee could comply with less rigorous
federal standards without a need for the conditions.141
Congress' view of the significance of the certification re-
quirement can also be inferred from actions that Congress took
when it amended the CWA in 1977. At that time, Congress
amended the text of section 401(a) to include a reference to sec-
tion 303 of, the CWA.142 In the report by the Committee recom-
mending this amendment, the Committee stated that the
amendment was made necessary not because Congress had
changed its view of the scope of section 401, but because federal
agencies had construed and applied the provision too narrowly-
these agencies had not yielded sufficient authority to states,
which had been granted the certification power.143 Congress also
141 This has been further elaborated by EPA:
While EPA approves State water quality standards and, if necessary,
promulgates Federal water quality standards, we do not have the author-
ity to countermand State Section 401 certification decisions. The only ex-
ception is that EPA regulations (40 CFR Section 124.55(c)) provide for
EPA to disregard State certification conditions or certification denials
when the grounds for the decision is [sic] that State law allows a less strin-
gent permit condition.
Hearing, supra note 7, at 224 (letter from LaJuana S. Wilcher, Assistant Admin-
istrator, Office of Water, EPA). See also S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3735 (Section 401 "continues the
authority of the State... to act to deny a permit and thereby prevent a Federal
license or permit from issuing to a discharge source within such State ....
Should such an affirmative denial occur no [federal] license or permit could be
issued... unless the State action was overturned in the appropriate courts of
jurisdiction.").
142 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (Supp. V 1981).
143 See S. REIP. No. 370, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 72-73 (1977), reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4326. The section was amended for clarification purposes:
Existing law requires that States certify that discharges resulting from ac-
tivities for which an applicant has applied for a Federal license or permit
will be in compliance with the provisions of the act. Currently the list of
provisions for which certification is necessary does not include section 303
of the act. The Congress intended in 1972 that State water quality stan-
dards would be imposed through section 301, and thus certification by the
State would include consideration of water quality standards. The failure
to explicitly include reference to section 303 has led to confusion, how-
ever, as to whether certification of compliance with water quality stan-
dards was required. This amendment follows the original congressional
intent and clarifies that.
Id. See also H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 830, 95th C6ng., 1st Sess. 96 (1977), reprinted
in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4424, 4471. The purpose of § 303 was discussed further:
The inserting of section 303 into the series of sections listed in section 401
is intended to mean that a federally licensed or permitted activity, includ-
ing discharge permits under section 402, must be certified to comply with
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clarified the expansive scope of the certification requirement by
explicitly providing that dredge and fill permits issued by the
Army Corps of Engineers under section 404 are subject to the
certification requirement. 144
In sum, under the CWA as enacted in 1972 and amended in
1977, Congress gave states significant authority when it required
that applicants for federal licenses and permits receive a certifica-
tion from any affected state that the applicant would not violate
state WQSs if the license or permit were granted. Federal agen-
cies did not have the power to overrule certification decisions,
which were permitted to be based on more rigorous state stan-
dards. Indeed, the only recourse available to a licensee objecting
to a state's action on a section 401 certification request is an ac-
tion in state court seeking judicial review-and in some states the
certification decision is unreviewable.145
The discussion now turns to how state courts and federal
agencies have viewed the interaction between the section 401
certification requirement of the CWA and the authority of FERC
to license hydropower facilities under the FPA.
State water quality standards adopted under section 303. The inclusion of
section 303 is intended to clarify the requirements of section 401.
Id.
144 See S. REP. No. 370, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 68 (1977), reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.CA.N. 4393:
The amendment to section 404 clarifies the intent of Congress relative to
the dredging activities of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. To maintain
navigation on the Nation's waterways is in the national interest. How-
ever, corps dredging activities, like any municipal or industrial discharge
to the Nation's waters, or any private dredging activities, should be con-
ducted in compliance with applicable State water quality standards. The
corps, like other Federal agencies, should be bound by the same require-
ments as any other discharger into public waters .... The intention of the
1972 act was not to exempt the corps or any other public or private agency
from State water quality standards and the interpretation of section 404
by the courts is at variance with the intent of Congress.
Id.
145 See Summit Hydropower Partnership v. Comm'r of Envtl Protection, 629
A.2d 367 (1993) (holding that because a hearing regarding certification is not
required by law, denial of certification does not involve a "contested case"
under the State's applicable statute, and there is accordingly no right of judicial
review); Triska v. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 355 S.E.2d 531 (1987)
(holding that because a hearing regarding certification is not required by law,
denial of certification does not involve a "contested case" under S.C. CODE
ANN. § 1-23-310(2) (Law. Co-op. 1976) and there is accordingly no right of judi-
cial review.).
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D. The Conflicting Interpretations of the Interaction of Section
401 Certification and Hydropower Licensing Under the FPA
Prior to the Supreme Court decision in PUD No. 1, state
courts, as well as federal agencies, had interpreted the CWA and
FPA interaction in several different ways. These varying inter-
pretations reflected a broad continuum. On one end is a view
that the CWA did little to displace FERC authority with respect
to the licensing of hydropower facilities. A centrist view holds
that FERC's licensing authority is abridged to the extent that
states must ensure conformance with their EPA-approved WQSs
(with some differences in 'opinion about the requirements that
states may impose through their WQSs). At the other end is a
view that states may condition FERC hydropower licenses not
only on conformance with WQSs, but with other state and local
requirements, such as land-use controls, as long as those require-
ments are at all related to water quality. This Article will now
briefly describe this continuum, identifying the principal legal ar-
guments urged by the proponents of each of the views along this
continuum.
Unsurprisingly, FERC views its own power to license facili-
ties under the FPA quite broadly,146 with the CWA establishing a
narrow exception to that authority.147 FERC's position has been
that section 401 gives states only the authority to ensure proper
"water column chemistry,' 48 but not to exert control over condi-
tions independent of that chemistry, such as conditions to ensure
146 See supra notes 20-27 and accompanying text. See also Blumm, supra
note 8, at 116 ("FERC has always maintained that it may license projects over
the objections of states, relying on forty-year old Supreme Court precedent.")
(footnote omitted).
147 Often, there are a number of conditions attached to 401 certifications:
FERC still receives copies of 401 certifications that include a myriad of
conditions that appear to have no direct or indirect nexus to water quality.
For example, we commonly see conditions relative to access, recreation,
fish screens and ladders, and fish and wildlife mitigative measures unre-
lated to water quality in state section 401 certificates.
Hearing, supra note 7, at 233 (letter from Fred E. Springer, Director, Office of
Hydropower Licensing, FERC).
148 This conflict has arisen between FERC and some states:
In separate letters to EPA, the States of Maine and Vermont raised con-
cerns about FERC's challenge to State authority under Section 401 to
consider the full range of water quality impacts, other than water column
chemistry. In a... letter to EPA, the State of West Virginia raised a
related concern that FERC has been reluctant to accept water quality rec-
ommendations for license conditions and in some cases issued project
licenses inconsistent with the State's recommendations.
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protection of wildlife or aquatic habitat or recreational re-
sources.149 FERC's position, which limits states to a concern
about how a water's chemistry will be affected by the discharge
of pollutants, received recent congressional support from the
Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.1so
Hearing, supra note 7, at 95 (statement of Martha G. Prothro, Deputy Assistant
Administrator, Office of Water, EPA). See also id. at 32 (statement of John D.
Echeverria, Counsel, National Audubon Society) ("ie Commission has
mounted an aggressive and unseemly attack on the authority of the States to
review the water quality effects of hydropower projects under section 401 of the
Clean Water Act."). See generally infra note 160 and accompanying text (stat-
ing EPA's ,iew that WQSs must properly address more than only water column
chemistry).
149 See Hearing, supra note 7, at 94 (statement of Martha G. Prothro, Deputy
Assistant Administrator, Office of Water, EPA) ("In a July 25, 1990 letter to
EPA, FERC indicated that conditions on Section 401 certificates that would
protect existing uses such as fisheries were unrelated to water quality."); Niag-
ara Mohawk Power Corp. v. New York Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 187
A.D.2d 7, 10-11, 592 N.Y.S.2d 141,144 (1993) ("[E]nvironmental and conserva-
tion factors of concern to a state are to be weighed at the Federal level; to allow
them to serve as a predicate for a state 'veto' of the project is indefensible for it
would effectively undermine the intent of Congress.") (citation omitted), afj'd,
624 N.E.2d 146 (1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2162 (1994).
150 See S. REP. No. 72, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 245-46 (1991) (Report on the
National Energy Security Act of 1991) (footnote omitted), which includes the
following discussion.
The Committee devoted considerable discussion to proposals to ad-
dress difficulties in the hydroelectric licensing process which have arisen
under the Clean Water Act. Under Section 401 of the Clean Water Act,
any applicant for a Federal license to conduct any activity which may re-
sult in the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters must generally
provide State certification that any such discharge will meet applicable
water quality standards under the Clean Water Act. Section 401 applies to
hydroelectric licensing under the Federal Power Act because of the possi-
bility that a hydroelectric project can affect water quality with respect to
various considerations such as dissolved oxygen, turbidity, and
temperature.
The Committee has been advised that some States have sought to
employ the section 401 process to condition hydroelectric projects with
respect to environmental or recreational matters that have nothing to do
with water pollution or section 401. Such actions are objectionable for two
reasons.
First, section 401 by its terms links the need for a permit to the possi-
bility of 'discharge' resulting from the permitted activity. While States
may have conditioning power associated with the certification process,
this power appears is bounded by the potential harm at issue (ie., dis-
charge of pollutants).
Second, all impacts of hydroelectric development other than 'dis-
charge of pollutants', including impacts on fish and wildlife habitat bene-
ficial uses, navigation, flood control and water supply, are already
considered under the rigorous and comprehensive licensing process en-
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FERC's position would grant it the greatest amount of li-
censing power, notwithstanding the CWA certification require-
ment. In a series of cases, beginning with one decided before the
1977 amendments to the CWA 151 and continuing after those
amendments,1 52 the New York Court of Appeals came to the
same basic conclusion that FERC retained considerable licensing
power even after accounting for state CWA certification.15 3 The
acted by the Electric Consumers Protection Act of 1986. States are given
full input into this licensing process. In the case of fish and wildlife im-
pacts, their recommendations are given special deference. Given'these
facts, the use of the section 401 certification process to condition hydroe-
lectric projects with respect to matters unrelated to water quality amounts'
to nothing more than an attempt to achieve 'a second bite at the apple'
which is not authorized under the Clean Water Act.
Such actions are not without cost licensing under the changes made
to the Federal Power Act by ECPA is already both costly and time con-
suming. The imposition of additional, redundant and possibly conflicting
layers of regulation under section 401 simply renders hydropower non-
viable as an energy resource.
The scope of State conditioning power under section 401 has been
litigated at least three times. In each instance, State courts have rejected
the notion that States may impose conditions unrelated to water quality.
The Committee agrees that these cases correctly interpret the statute. In
light of the consistent result reached in litigation so far, the Committee
finds it unnecessary at this time tb take any action in this bill regarding
section 401 of the Clean Water Act and hydroelectric licensing.
Id.
151 de Rham v. Diamond, 295 N.E.2d 763 (1973).
152 Power Auth. of N.Y. v. Williams, 457 N.E.2d 726, 729 (1983). The Wil-
hams court held that:
[T]he outcome of this appeal has been preordained by our decision in de
Rham v. Diamond, a case which involved the very issue on which the
Appellate Division annulled the commissioner's action in the present
cae-i.e., the scope and breadth of the commissioner's inquiry in passing
on an application for the water quality certification required by FWPCA
as a prerequisite to Federal licensing of certain hydroelectric power
projects.
Id. (citations omitted).
153 See de Rham, 295 N.E.2d at 767. The de Rham court stated:
Congress, by the [FPA,] has vested the Federal Power Commission with
broad responsibility for the development of national policies in the area
of electric power, granting it sweeping powers and a specific planning re-
sponsibility with respect to the regulation and licensing of hydroelectric
facilities affecting the navigable waters of the United States. The Com-
mission's jurisdiction with respect to such projects pre-empts all State li-
censing and permit functions.
Id. (footnote and citations omitted). See also Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., v.
New York Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 187 A.D.2d 7,9,592 N.Y.S,2d 141,143
(1993) ("[T]he Clean Water Act contains a narrow exception to FERC's exclu-
sive jurisdiction, insofar as it empowers states to certify whether a project corn-
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New York Courts concluded, however, that the CWA certifica-
tion authority did allow a state to ensure that a hydropower pro-
ject will not cause a violation of state-approved water quality
criteria. 54 In the view of the New York courts, such criteria may
plies with its water quality requirements and makes such a state certification
necessary before a license may be granted.") (citation omitted); Long Lake En-
ergy Corp. v. New York Dep't of EnvtL Conservation, 164 A.D.2d 396,402,563
N.Y.S.2d 871, 875 (1990) ("The issue in this case thus distills to whether respon-
dent's considerations of water quality standards disregarded the very limited
nature of the activity left by 33 U.S.C. § 1341 to state action in the certification
process.").
A Pennsylvania court reached a similar decision in Commonwealth Dep't
of EnvtL Resources v. Harrisburg, 578 A.2d 563 (Pa. Commw. 1990). There,
the Department of Environmental Resources (DER) had identified the follow-
ing nine reasons for denying certification of a hydropower license under § 401:
[loss of wetlands, impact from increased groundwater levels, impact of
increased dissolved oxygen levels, impact on nutrient problems in the Co-
nodoguinet Creek, impact of combining existing sewer overflows, impact
upon the 150 acre area between the proposed dam and the existing Dock
Street Dam, impact upon aquatic resources upstream of the impound-
ment, impact upon migration of migratory fish, and impact of increased
sedimentation within the pool area.
Id. at 565 n.4. The court concluded that DER exceeded its authority when it
acted to deny certification for these reasons, stating that:
[A]uthority to review the environmental effects of the project encom-
passed by the term 'pollution' is vested in the Corps of Engineers and in
the EPA by Section 404 of the CWA.... DER exceeded its authority by
examining the impact of physical changes in the river on aquatic resources
and the effect of the project on wetlands and fish migration, which we
hold are not within DER's authority under Section 401 of the CWA.
Id. at 567.
154 In de Rham, the court stated:
Section 21 (subd. [b]) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act relin-
quishes only one element of the otherwise exclusive jurisdiction granted
the Power Commission by the Federal Power Act. It authorizes States to
determine and certify only the narrow question whether there is 'reason-
able assurance' that the construction and operation of a proposed project
'will not violate applicable water quality standards' of the State. That is
all that section 21 (subd. [b]) did, and all that it was designed to do.
295 N.E.2d at 768. Courts applying de Rham have understood the reference to
water quality standards to mean the water quality criteria defined in state law as
required to ensure the state's intended uses for its waters. See Fourth Branch
Assocs. v. Dep't of EnvtL Conservation, 146 Misc. 2d 334, 347, 550 N.Y.S.2d
769, 777 (N.Y. Sup. CL 1989):
Thus it is clear that the Federal Power Act preempts NYSDEC from con-
ducting a full SEQRA review of AHDC's 401 water quality certification.
-The Commissioner is entitled only to review A.HDC's application to the
extent necessary to ascertain whether or not the State Dam Project would
offend against the applicable regulations (6 NYCRR Part 701) governing
"Class 'C?" waters, the classification of the Mohawk River at the State
Dam site. (6 NYCRR Section 876.4).
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regulate more than merely water column chemistry, 155 but they
may not interfere with the broad weighing of costs and benefits,
including environmental costs and benefits, that is delegated to
FERC,15 6 and they may not subject license applicants to environ-
mental requirements and procedures that are independent of the
wAter quality criteria.1 57 The focus on properly-approved water
I& (footnote omitted).
155 Such criteria might, for example, establish minimum flow requirements.
Even this somewhat limited requirement that a FERC licensee comply only
with state water quality criteria may, however, significantly constrain a licen-
see's operations. See, e.g., Long Lake Energy, 164 A.D.2d at 403, 563 N.Y.S.2d
at 875 ("Since 'such things as turbidity and temperature change' are clearly fac-
tors affecting water quality, respondent neither exceeded the scope of its au-
thority nor was irrational in requesting additional information from petitioner
which would require those elements to be considered.") (footnote omitted).
156 See de Rham, 265 N.E.2d at 768. The court commented:
[T]he Commissioner has neither the authority nor the duty to delve into
the many other issues-which had been investigated and decided by the
Federal Power Commission in the course of the extensive proceedings it
had conducted-such as, for instance, (1) the safety of the Catskill
Aqueduct, (2) the appearance of the Hudson River shoreline or (3) the
protection of the River's fish life, apart from the effect that destruction of,
or injury to, fish may have, by introduction of waste or pollutants, on the
water quality standards required by the applicable regulations.
Id. See also Niagara Mohawk Power, 187 A.D.2d at 11,592 N.Y.S.2d at 144. In
Niagara Mohawk Power, the court held:
When the actual provisions of the ECL which DEC seeks to invoke are
examined, it is clear that they address the very matters that have been
reserved by the FPA for determination at the Federal level-dam safety,
general balancing of economic and other concerns, the effect on wildlife,
recreational opportunities and the like. The 1986 amendments to the
FPA, which require FERC to consider fish and wildlife habitats, recrea-
tional opportunities and environmental quality in general as part of the
licensing process, indicate that Congress intended such matters to remain
within the Federal domain, as factors to be balanced against other
concerns.
Id. See also Fourth Branch Assocs., 146 Misc. 2d at 348 n.11, 550 N.Y.S.2d at
778 n.14 ("Broad scope environmental review having been reserved exclusively
to FERC, NYSDEC has no authority to require AHDC to furnish information
concerning the effect of the proposed project on anything other than water
quality.") (citation omitted).
157 See Williams, 457 N.E.2d at 729 ("We reverse the order of the Appellate
Division and remit the case to it for consideration of issues raised by PASNY in
this proceeding, other than its contention that the commissioner erred in not
considering energy and general environmental factors as well as conformity to
water quality standards in making his decision on, PASNY's application."). See
also Fourth Branch.Assocs., 146 Misc. 2d at 346, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 777 ("[T1here
can be no doubt that the State can not impose SEQRA review upon a section
401 water quality certification, for to do so would allow the... State of New
York to duplicate and possibly contravene the final decision-making authority
of the Federal Government with respect to these projects, when exclusive au-
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quality criteria partly reflects the understanding of the reviewing
courts that these environmental requirements will have been sub-
ject to thoughtful debate and review within the state.158
Next along the continuum of interpretations of section 401
certification is the view that, in order to receive a federal license,
the applicant must demonstrate that the hydropower project will
comply with all components of the state's WQSs, including not
only the water quality criteria, but also the state's defined uses
and nondegradation policy.'5 9 This appears to describe the posi-
thority has been entrusted to FERC by the Federal Power Act.") (citation omit-
ted); Niagara Mohawk Power, 187 A.D.2d at 10, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 143. The
Niagara Mohawk court explained its holding:
We are now asked by respondents to declare that other statutory and reg-
ulatory provisions, more indirectly related to water quality, may be used
as a basis for review under section 401. Because we believe that to do so
would extend DEC's 'veto power' over FERC-regulated projects well be-
yond that intended by Congress, we affirm the judgment of Supreme
Court.
IdL
158 See Williams, 457 N.E.2d at 730, n.3, in which the court comments on the
interests that may be considered as part of the process of setting WQSs. The
court states that:
It does not follow, however, from the inability of the commissioner to
consider more than compliance with water quality standards in acting on
an application for section 401 certification that all other factors are neces-
sarily disregarded or beyond reach at the State level. To the contrary,
public interests of broad scope are implicated both in the classification of
State waters, which is required to be done 'in accordance with considera-
tions of best usage in the interest of the public' (ECL 17-0301, subd. 2),
and in the fixing of standards of purity within classifications, which are to
be established consistent with a variety of interests.
ld. See also iUd at 730. The court explains further that:
The Appellate Division erred in remitting PASNY's application for sec-
tion 401 certification to respondent commissioner who had neither au-
thority nor responsibility to engage in balancing economic, energy,
environmental or other factors or to reflect public interest other than as it
is set forth in the State water quality standards.
Id.
159 See Bangor Hydro-Elec. Co. v. Board of EnvtL Protection, 595 A-2d 438
(Me. 1991). There, the court emphasized that WQSs include more than only
water quality criteria: "The water standards for each class of Maine waters con-
tain three parts: a list of designated uses, a set of numerical criteria for water
chemistry (dissolved oxygen and bacteria counts), and a set of narrative criteria
on the permissible level of pollutant discharges." Id at 442 (citation omitted).
The court concluded that, when considering whether to certify a proposed pro-
ject under § 401, the state agency has authority to consider whether the pro-
posed project is inconsistent with a designated use:
We cannot conclude that the designated uses .. are mere surplusage.
The level of detail bespeaks a considered determination of the public in-
terest. This legislative determination would be rendered a nullity if the
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tion of EPA, which believes that WQSs must do more than pro-
tect water column chemistry,160 must include more than only
water quality criteria,161 and should define more than numerical
limits for pollution levels.162
agency responsible for reviewing compliance could consider only the nu-
merical criteria and not whether the designated uses actually were
achieved in a particular river.
Id. at 443 (footnote omitted). The court further stated: "[T]he Board's informa-
tion requirements were based upon designated uses that we hold are an integral
part of the state water quality standards. The Board was within its jurisdiction
in reviewing Bangor Hydro's measures for future compliance with those stan-
dards under section 401(a)." Id. At a legislative hearing regarding § 401, the
Maine Supreme Court was discussed approvingly:
I think the correct view of section 401 is that reached by the Maine
Supreme Court, which held that the section 401 authority, as it applies to
water quality, impacts the project as a whole and not just the pipe that
comes out of the bottom of the dam and the authority is not limited to
water chemistry, but the State has authority in carrying out its responsibil-
ities under the Clean Water Act to protect the uses of water that the
Clean Water Act is designed to protect.
Hearing, supra note 7, at 61 (statement of John D. Echeverfia, Counsel, Na-
tional Audubon Society).
160 See Hearing, supra note 7, at 128 (statement of Martha G. Prothro, Dep-
uty Assistant Administrator, Office of Water, EPA) (emphasis added) ("it is
our position that the Clean Water Act is clearly designed to protect biological,
chemical and physical integrity of the Nation's waters. Even though EPA and
the States have focused in recent years on many water chemistry kinds of issues,
the Act is not restricted to these, and in fact, State water quality standards are
inadequate if they address only water chemistry."). See also Hearing, supra note
7, at 127-28. Here, this EPA official made the following comments:
States that have water quality standards addressing the biological integrity
of their waters or the physical integrity, in other words the protection of
habitat, the protection of biological resources, would not necessarily be
protected strictly by water chemistry. And we had several complaints
from States that they were concerned that FERC wasn't recognizing their
authority in these areas, and that FERC was reading water quality stan-
dards very, very narrowly, contrary to Clean Water Act provisions that
have long existed.
See Hearing, supra note 7, at 127-28 (same); See generally supra notes 148-149
and accompanying text.
161 See 40 C.F.R. § 131.6 (when submitting WQSs for EPA approval, the state
must include along with water quality criteria use designations that will be ade-
quately supported by the criteria and a sufficient antidegradation policy).
162 See Niagara Mohawk Power, 187 A.D.2d at 10, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 143 (EPA
"note[s] that these water quality standards are not limited to 'chemical-specific
criteria,' but rather that states are encouraged to adopt both narrative and nu-
merical criteria, and will shortly be required to include biological criteria."); see
also 187 A.D. 2d at 10-11, 592 N.Y.S. at 143 ("[E]ven the EPA recognizes that
the proper mechanism by which a state may apply water quality provisions to a
project licensed under the FPA is by adopting standards under section 303,
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This portion of the continuum in fact includes two different
views of the extent of the certification requirement-views that
depend on the requirements that a state decides may be included
properly in its WQSs. The narrower view was taken by a Con-
necticut state court, which declared in dicta that the CWA did
not authorize a state to include in its WQSs purely aesthetic stan-
dards.163 In the court's view, WQSs must regulate water quality,
and pure aesthetics do not directly relate to the quality of the
waters, particularly when the CWA certification requirement is
considered in the context of FERC licensing. 164 The broader
which, if Federally approved, may then be enforced as part of the certification
procedure.") (citation omitted).
163 In Summit Hydropower Partnership v. Comm'r of EnvtL Protection, No.
CV 910502643, 1992 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2177, at *1 (July 20, 1992), rev'd on
other grounds, 629 A.2d 367 (Conn. 1993), the court reviewed a decision to
deny state section 401 certification for a proposed hydropower project. Evi-
dence demonstrated that, if the project were licensed, all requirements identi-
fied in state water quality criteria, antidegradation policy, and designated uses
would be met. Id. at *21. The Commissioner of Environmental Protection nev-
ertheless denied section 401 certification based on the conclusion -that the
viewing of Cargill Falls is a recreational use and that the project would have a
detrimental effect on the aesthetic quality of viewing the falls by reducing the
water level of the natural river flow." Id. at *24. The court held that this action
was improper because "the aesthetics of viewing the falls, is not a WQS." Id. at
*29. The court then stated its opinion that the state would not have authority to
identify preservation of the aesthetics of viewing the falls as a component of the
state's WQSs:
The problem with the defendants' argument is that the aesthetics of view-
ing the water is not a standard in the DEP's existing regulations, not au-
thorized by the enabling statutes as a proper WQS and, in any event,
cannot objectively be considered a factor in evaluating water quality.
While the federal statutes defer to a limited extent to state WQS in ap-
proving a hydroelectric project, at some point the federal preemption doc-
trine prevents state rejection for reasons having at best a marginal
relationship to water quality.
Id at *30.
164 See supra note 148: See also Summit Hydropower Partnership, 1992
Conn. Super. LEXIS 2177, at *29-30. The court stated:
The FWPCA relinquishes only one element of the otherwise exclusive
production under the Federal Power Act, by allowing the state agency to
determine only the narrow question whether there is reasonable assur-
ance that the construction and operation of the proposed project vill not
violate applicable state WQS. The state agency cannot engage in a
broader environmental impact review of the project or reject it for any
reasons except noncompliance with existing WQS.
Id. (citations omitted). The court further stated that:
To the extent the federal statutes defer to stricter standards in state water
quality regulations and recreational use of water in particular, it is appar-
ent from several federal statutes and regulations that the recreational ac-
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view of the certification requirement was taken by the Vermont
Supreme Court, which held that the state had authority to in-
clude purely aesthetic requirements in its WQSs and conse-
quently to deny section 401 certification or condition certification
based on whether the aesthetic standard would be met if the pro-
posed facility were licensed. In the Vermont court's view, the
CWA was intended to protect, the aesthetics of waters, as well as
their quality.165
The final viewalong the continuum marks the point of great-
est state authority to impose conditions on federal licensees
under section 401 of the CWA. The Oregon Supreme Court has
focused on the language of section 401(d), which refers to "any
other appropriate requirement of State law" in defining when a
state may impose conditions on a federal licensee.1 66 Based on
tivities to be protected are those 'in and on the water' and not some
vague, aesthetic impression from viewing the waters at a distance.
lt (citation omitted) at *31.
165 See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Vermont Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 35
Env't Rep. (BNA) 2046 (Vt. Super. Ct. 1991), aff d, 628 A.2d 944 (Vt. 1992), in
which the operators of a dam originally built in 1900 sought § 401 certification
as part of relicensing. Id. at 2047. The state agency issued the required certifi-
cation, but imposed as a condition of that certification a minimum continuous
flow requirement. 1d. at 2050. The superior court upheld that condition, ap-
proving of the agency's view that the condition was necessary to ensure the
proper aesthetics of the waterway. Id, at 2051. The court held:
In addition to the express finding that a continuous flow of 210 cfs is re-
quired to restore and improve the Connecticut River as a fish habitat, the
DEC also concluded that the specified continuous flow was required to
safeguard the aesthetic appeal of the river to the numerous persons who
use the river for recreation during the specified time period. The aes-
thetic determination forms a strong independent basis upon which to up-
hold the 210 cfs continuous spill requirement during the specified time
period.
Id. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed that decision, reasoning that the
state's WQSs required that the river's aesthetics were to be protected. Id. at
2053-54. Thus, the court held that:
Vermont's water quality standards promulgated in accordance with th[e
Clean Water] Act require that the Connecticut River be managed for
'water of a quality which consistently exhibits good aesthetic value... and
recreation.' Vermont Water Quality Standards § 3-03. The DEC spillage
requirement was amply supported by the evidence. Not only were aes-
thetics and recreation considered relevant, ease of administration and
monitoring were fostered by the requirement.
Id. (citation omitted).
166 33 U.S.C. § 1341(d) (1994) provides that a state may include in a section
401 certification conditions that are
necessary to assure that any applicant for a Federal license or permit will
comply with any applicable effluent limitations and other limitations,
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this text, the court decided that the state may impose conditions
on federal licensees that are needed to ensure compliance with
state and local land-use regulations,167 provided that those regu-
under section 1311 or 1312 of this title, standard of performance under
section 1316 of this title, or prohibition, effluent standard, or pretreatment
standard under section 1317 of this title, and with any other appropriate
requirement of State law set forth in such certification ....
Id. (emphasis added).
167 In Arnold Irrigation Dist. v. Dep't of Envt. Quality, 717 P.2d 1274 (Or.
1986), the court considered whether compliance with land-use regulations could
be considered by the state agency in deciding whether to certify a hydropower
project under § 401. The court first held that the failure to comply with land-
use regulations cannot be the basis for a decision to deny § 401 certification:
Violation of one of those [water quality standard] sections or regulations
is the only basis on which the state has authority under the CWA to deny
the certificate .... They may not consider other factors than compliance
with the provisions listed in 33 USC § 1341(a)(1) and with the state regu-
lations in deciding whether to issue a certificate. EQC therefore erred
when it affirmed DEQ's denial on the basis of a failure to show compli-
ance with state and county land use requirements.
See id. at 1278. The court, however, then held that the state agency did have
authority to consider compliance with those land-use regulations in defining
under § 401(d) the conditions that had to be included in the § 401 certification.
Id. ("Although [§ 1341(d)] does not allow DEQ to consider land use and other
issues outside the CWA in deciding whether to approve certification applica-
tions, it may be able to consider those factors in deciding what limitations to
place on the certificate."). The court concluded that, when it enacted § 401(d),
Congress
allowed the states to enforce all water quality-related statutes and rules
through the state's authority to place limitations on section 1341 certifi,
cates. Congress thereby required federal licensing authorities to respect
all state water quality laws in licensing projects involving discharges to
navigable streams. '[A]ny other appropriate requirement of State law' is
thus a Congressional recognition of all state action related to water qual.
ity and Congressional authorization to the states to consider those actions
in imposing limitations on CWA certificates. It does not, however, allow
limitations which are not related to water quality.
Id. at 1279.
The New York State Department of Environmental Quality views the
scope of the § 401 certification requirement in similarly broad terms. See Hear-
ing, supra note 7, at 112 (statement of Marc S. Gerstman, Deputy Commis-
sioner and General Counsel, New York Dep't of Envtl Conservation)
("Through our certification process, we ensure that each hydropower facility
complies with. water quality standards; effluent limitations; stream-bed distur-
bance and excavation and fill requirements; dam construction and safety provi-
sions; freshwater wetland requirements; fish and wildlife requirements; and the
State's Environmental Quality Review Act."). New York courts have, however,
rejected the broad construction of § 401(d) adopted by the Oregon court. See
Fourth Branch Assocs., 146 Misc. 2d at 340, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 773 (interpreting
the § 401(d) language referring to "any other appropriate requirement of State
law" narrowly, stating that "[ilt is apparent, when viewed in the context of both
Section 401 and the entire [CWA], that this language only refers to the author-
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lations are in any way related to water quality.1 68 The court de-
cided that conditions based on such land-use regulations may be
imposed even though EPA has not approved the land-use regula-
tions as WQSs under the CWA.169
In sum, state courts and the two most interested federal
agencies-FERC and EPA-have reached varied conclusions
about the extent of authority that section 401 of the CWA grants
to state agencies when deciding upon requests for certifications
for FERC hydropower licensees.
III
Tim SuPRME COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE
INTERACTION OF Tri CWA AND THE FPA
The case that the Supreme Court heard on the merits, PUD
No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Department of Ecol-
ogy,170 involved an application to construct a hydropower project
on the Dosewallips River in Washington State.171 As required by
section 401 of the CWA, the applicants for the FERC license
sought certification from Washington's Department of Ecology.
The Department of Ecology issued the certification with a
number of conditions, including the condition that the project
conform to "a minimum stream-flow requirement of between 100
and 200 cfs [cubic feet per second] depending on the season."'72
The applicants sought review before the Pollution Control
Hearings Board, contending that the state agency was not au-
ity of a State to establish water quality standards 'more restrictive than those
imposed by the Act."') (citation omitted).
168 See Arnold Irrigation Dist., 717 P.2d at 1279 ("Only if a goal or plan pro-
vision has absolutely no relationship to water quality would it not be an 'other
appropriate requirement of State law.' In that case, and only in that case,
would the CWA override DEQ's obligations under ORS 197.180(1)."); see also
id. ("Many uses of land may affect water quality, even if they do not immedi-
ately result in direct discharges to the state's waters.").
169 See id. ("If it grants petitioners' request for a [§ 401] certificate, [the state
agency] must require, as a condition of that certificate, that petitioners comply
with the water-related portions of the Deschutes County land use regulations.")
(citation omitted).
170 114 S. Ct. 1900 (1994), affg, 849 P.2d 646 (Wash. 1992).
171 Id. at 1907. The Court stated that, "[i]f constructed as presently planned,
the facility would be located just outside the Olympic National Park on feder-
ally owned land within the Olympic National Forest. The project would divert
water from a 1.2-mile reach of the River (the bypass reach), run the water
through turbines to generate electricity and then return the water to the River
below the bypass reach." Id.
172 Id. at 1908.
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thorized to impose the minimum stream flow requirement.1 73
The applicants won a partial victory before that board, which
held that, although the state agency had the authority to impose
minimum flow requirements as part of the section 401 certifica-
tion, the minimum flow that the agency had mandated was im-
proper because it was not needed to preserve the river's fishery,
but instead was being used to enhance the fishery.174 Both sides
appealed that decision in state court, where the state agency won
before both the Superior Court and the Washington Supreme
Court. The latter court rejected the applicants' contention that
the section 401 certification should only involve consideration of
how the discharge at the dam will affect pollution levels.175 This
interpretation appears quite similar to the very narrow view of
section 401 certification taken by FERC.176
The Washington court then held that, when evaluating
whether a proposed project can be certified under section 401,
the agency should consider not only whether the project will
cause violations of the WQS criteria, but also whether the project
is consistent with the other components of the state's WQSs such
as the state's designated uses and nondegradation policy.'" This
portion of the court's decision is consistent with the cases in the
middle of the continuum of interpretations of the section 401 cer-
tification requirement.178
The Washington court also considered the state agency's ar-
gument that the minimum stream flow requirement could also be
upheld as a condition needed to ensure compliance with "any
other appropriate requirement of State law."' 79 The agency ar-
gued that the minimum stream flow requirement was appropriate
173 See PUD No. 1, 849 P.2d at 649.
174 See id.
175 See 849 P.2d at 651 (The applicants "argue[ ] that water quality standards
are limited to pollution and discharges, as opposed to stream flow levels....
However,... the standards' explicitly-stated antidegradation policy and classifi-
cation of specific bodies of water in terms of characteristic uses, as well as the
standards' broad purpose, all demonstrate a broad concern for water quality,
not just with pollution discharges.") (citation omitted).
176 See supra notes 147-151 and accompanying text.
177 PUD No. 1, 849 P.2d at 650-51. See also id. at 650 ("[S]ection 401 re-
quires states to certify compliance with state water quality standards. Washing-
ton's standards prohibit the degradation of the state's waters, and prohibit the
degradation of fish habitat and spawning in the Dosewalips in particular.").
178 See supra notes 160-166 and accompanying text for a discussion of these
cases.
179 33 U.S.C. § 1341(d) (1994).
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regardless of the state's WQSs, because of a state law require-
ment that "[p]erennial rivers and streams of the state shall be
retained with base flows necessary to provide for preservation of
wildlife, fish, scenic, aesthetic and other environmental values,
and navigational values."' 8 0 The court held that this interpreta-
tion of the CWA was correct and thus joined Oregon in the same
generously expansive reading of the CWA certification require-
ment, holding that a state may condition a section 401 certifica-
tion on compliance with a provision of state law that is not a part
of the state WQSs and that has been neither reviewed nor ap-
proved by EPA.18l The court decided, finally, that this broad
reading of state CWA certification authority is not inconsistent
with or narrowed by the licensing authority of FERC under the
FPA.1S2
When the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari,
environmentalists and state environmental agencies had reason
to be quite apprehensive. The case involved a state's attempt to
impose a minimum flow requirement .on a hydropower project
subject to FERC licensing, and the Court had only recently held
180 WASH. REV. CODE § 90.54.020(3)(a) (1994) (Water Resources Act of
1971). See PUD No. 1, 849 P.2d at 651.
181 Pud No. 1, 849 P.2d at 653. The Court concluded:
[T]he phrase 'any other appropriate requirement of State law' in section
'401(d) does not refer only to state water quality standards. We agree with
the Arnold court that the phrase is a congressional authorization to the
states to consider all state action related to water quality in imposing con-
ditions on section 401 certificates.
Id. (citation omitted). See also id. at 651. The court held also that:
The Board ruled that the phrase ['any other appropriate requirement of
State law'] refers to all'state water quality-related statutes and rules, in-
cluding, but not limited to, the water quality standards the state has
adopted as required by section 303 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1313, and that Ecology's streamtlow conditions were necessary to assure
compliance with RCW 90.54.020(3)(a). We agree with the Board's
interpretation.
Il The interpretation adopted by the Oregon court in Arnold is discussed
supra at notes 167-69 and accompanying text.
182 PUD No. 1, 849 P.2d at 655. In considering the FPA and the CWA
together
the comprehensive scheme that emerges is one in which Congress left
room for the states to supplement the FPA through the section 401 certifi-
cation process. Enforcement of state laws is part of the federal scheme
inasmuch as section 401 of the Act requires states to assure compliance
with appropriate state laws. The comprehensive scheme consisting of
both the Clean Water Act and the FPA presupposes rather than precludes
the exercise of state authority....
Id
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that a state had no such power under the authority that Congress
had granted FERC in the FPA.18 Moreover, the Court had reaf-
firmed in that case its forty-four year old decision that the federal
agency had paramount authority in the licensing of hydropower
projects, based on a strong rule of stare decisis and recent con-
gressional action,18 if not on a natural reading of the FPA
text.185 Finally, in recent years the Court has been generally un-
willing to grant states authority to act to protect their local envi-
ronment, particularly when the Court believes that a state's
actions may interfere with interstate commerce, regardless of the
environmental value of those actions.1 s6 In short, a Supreme
Court observer would have predicted that the CWA section 401
certification requirement most likely would not trump the para-
mount role of FERC defined by the Court in its interpretations
of the FPA.
The decision in PUD No. 1 was therefore unexpected, with
the Court upholding the state's authority to impose minimum
flow requirements when exercising the section 401 certification
authority.18 7 As examples of statutory interpretation by the
Court, the majority and dissenting opinions were also unex-
pected. First, the majority opinion, written by Justice O'Connor
for a seven-Justice majority, was a surprising example of the at-
traction of the textualist approach to statutory interpretation.
Relying almost exclusively on the CWA's text and including vir-
tually no discussion of the paramount authority over hydropower
licensing that, in the Court's view, Congress had delegated to
FERC in the FPA, the majority held that states could exercise
183 California v. FERC, 495 U.S. at 490 (discussed supra at notes 66-76 and
accompanying text).
184 Ld. at 499.
185 1L at 498.
186 See, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677
(1994) (striking down under the dormant commerce clause a local flow control
ordinance); Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural
Resources, 504 U.S. 353 (1992) (striking down under the dormant commerce
clause a comprehensive regulatory scheme for the disposal of solid waste within
the state). Cf. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (striking down
portion of federal law regulating low-level radioactive waste disposal because
the law imposed improper obligations on the states).
187 See Katherine P. Ransel, The Sleeping Giant Awakens: PUD No. 1 of
Jefferson County v. Washington Department of Ecology, 25 Ewvr- L 255,255-
56 (1995) (discussing how the Supreme Court decision "has caused a dramatic
shift in the balance of power struck during the Progressive era in favor of cen-
tralized federal authority over the uses of the Nation's navigable waters").
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important control over federal hydropower projects through the
use of their section 401 certification authority. The textualist ap-
proach yielded this alluring result because, as will be elaborated,
it permitted the Court to avoid any discussion of the tension, or
contextual ambiguity, created by the interaction of the two rele-
vant federal statutes.
The dissenting opinion contained its own interpretive sur-
prise. Written by Justice Thomas and joined by Justice Scalia, it
reflected the views of the Court's two most outspoken supporters
of the textualist approach to statutory interpretation. The sur-
prise vas the implicit recognition by these Justices of the limits of
the textualist approach: the dissenters argued, based in part on
the text of the CWA, but more determinedly on the grounds of
policy and purpose, that the scheme of federal hydropower li-
censing would be upset if it were dependent on broad state au-
thority to certify and condition the certification of federal
hydropower licensing. 188 The implied limits on textualism recog-
nized by the dissent will be examined shortly.
The majority's effort to construe section 401 began with a
rejoinder to the narrow reading of the text of section 401 urged
by the dissent. The dissent contended that section 401 must be
read to limit section 401 certifications to the consideration of the
effects of the "discharge" that will result from the activity to be
licensed, 8 9 and that a minimum flow requirement has no such
relationship to the discharge that will result from licensing the
hydropower project.1 90 The majority rejected this reading of the
text, concluding that section 401 gives states broader certification
power; once the certification requirement is triggered by a dis-
charge, states have authority to ensure through conditions or lim-
itations that the activity to be licensed will not result in a
violation of WQSs.191
188 PUD No. 1, 114 S. Ct. at 1919 (Thomas, 3., dissenting).
189 Id at 1915-16.
190 Id at 1915. It is worth noting that no other court had construed § 401 to
have such a narrow effect.
191 The Court reached this conclusion in two steps. First, it decided in light of
the text of § 401(d) that the § 401 certification applies to the impact of the activ-
ity to be licensed. Id at 1909 ("Section 401(a)(1) identifies the category of
activities subject to certification-namely those with discharges. And § 401(d)
is most reasonably read as authorizing additional conditions and limitations on
the activity as a whole once the threshold condition, the existence of a dis-
charge, is satisfied."). The Court then decided that the § 401 certification re-
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In deciding that a state may properly ensure compliance
with WQSs by use of the section 401 certification, the Court clar-
ified to some extent the point along the continuum of interpreta-
tions of section 401 that properly identifies the scope of the
certification requirement. The Court rejected the end of the con-
tinuum defined by the views of FERC and the New York
courts:192 section 401 certification is not limited solely to ensuring
compliance with defined water quality criteria aimed at protect-
ing water column chemistry.193
The Court then signalled that in its view the scope of section
401 certification extends at least as far as the middle of the con-
tinuum of interpretations of section 401.194 The Court held that a
certification may be conditioned to ensure not only that water
quality criteria are met, but also to ensure that the state's desig-
nated uses for a waterway are protected' 95 and that the state's
nondegradation policy is not violated. 196 The Court based this in-
terpretation on the text of the CWA,197 its consistency with EPA
quirement accordingly permits states to impose conditions that are needed to
ensure compliance with WQSs. The Court stated that:
[E]nsuring compliance with § 303 [Le, WQSs] is a proper function of the
§ 401 certification. Although § 303 is not one of the statutory provisions
listed in § 401(d), the statute allows states to impose limitations to ensure
compliance with § 301 of the Act .... Section 301 in turn incorporates
§ 303 by reference .... As a consequence, state water quality standards
adopted pursuant to § 303 are among the "other limitations' with which a
State may ensure compliance through the § 401 certification process. This
interpretation is consistent with EPA's view of the statute.... Moreover,
limitations to assure compliance with state water quality standards are
also permitted by § 401(d)'s reference to 'any other appropriate require-
ment of State law.'... [L]imitations imposed pursuant to state water qual-
ity standards adopted pursuant to § 303 are "appropriate" requirements
of state law.
Id at 1909-10 (citations omitted). In Ransel, supra note 187, at 266, the author
argues that the majority's broad reading of the text of § 401 is supported as well
by a review of how the current text of the provision evolved.
192 See supra notes 152-59 and accompanying text.
193 PUD No. 1, 114 S. Ct. at 1910 (indicating that the Court "disagree[s]"
with the applicants' position that "the State may only require that the project
comply with specific numerical 'criteria"').
194 For a discussion of this part of the continuum, see supra notes 160-166 and
accompanying text.
195 PUD No. 1, 114 S. Ct. at 1914.
196 Id at 1912 ("The Solicitor General, representing EPA, asserts and we
agree, that the State's minimum stream flow condition is a proper application of
the state and federal antidegradation regulations, as it ensures that an 'existing
instream water us[e]' will be 'maintained and protected."') (citations omitted).
197 Id. at 1910. The Court stated:
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policy recognizing the independent significance of designated
uses as a component of the WQSs, 198 the fact that water quality
criteria may themselves be quite subjective,199 and the interpreta-
tion's consistency with the protective policy of the CWA.
200
We think the language of § 303 is most naturally read to require that a
project be consistent with both components, namely the designated use
and the water quality criteria. Accordingly, under the literal terms of the
statute, a project that does not comply with a designated use of the water
does not comply with the applicable water quality standards.
Id.
198 IL at 1911 ("ITIhe EPA regulations implicitly recognize that in some cir-
cumstances, criteria alone are insufficient to protect a designated use.").
199 In the Court's view, common sense supported its reading of the statute
because the CWA clearly allows enforcement of narrative criteria which, in the
Court's view, are hard to distinguish from designated uses. Id. ("[P]etitioners'
attempt to distinguish between uses and criteria loses much of its force in light
of the fact that the Act permits enforcement of broad, narrative criteria based
on, for example, 'aesthetics."').
200 The Court decided that allowing for the protection of uses furthers the
protective purpose of the CWA because such protection is a good supplement
to enforcing compliance with only-the criteria. The Court stated that:
The criteria components of state water quality standards attempt to iden-
tify, for all the water bodies in a given class, water quality requirements
generally sufficient to protect designated uses. These criteria, however,
cannot reasonably be expected to anticipate all the water quality issues
arising from every activity which can affect the State's hundreds of indi-
vidual water bodies. Requiring the States to enforce only the criteria
component of their water quality standards would in essence require the
States to study to a level of great specificity each individual surface water
to ensure that the criteria applicable to that water are sufficiently detailed
and individualized to fully protect the water's designated uses. Given that
there is no textual support for imposing this requirement, we are loath to
attribute to Congress an intent to impose this heavy regulatory burden on
the States.
Id. at 1912. The Court further elaborated:
While enforcement of criteria will in general protect the uses of these di-
verse waters, a complementary requirement that activities also comport
with designated uses enables the States to ensure that each activity-even
if not foreseen by the criteria-will be consistent with the specific uses
and attributes of a particular body of water.
1d. at 1911. Based on similar reasoning, the Court also rejected the applicants'
efforts to distinguish between water quality and water quantity and to claim
that the CWA is intended to protect only water quality. The Court stated that:
This is an artificial distinction. In many cases, water quantity is closely
related to water quality; a sufficient lowering of the water quantity in a
body of water'could destroy all of its designated uses, be it for drinking
water, recreation, navigation or, as here, as a fishery. In any event, there
is recognition in the Clean Water Act itself that reduced stream flow, i.e.,
diminishment of water quantity, can constitute water pollution.
Id. at 1912-13.
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Having decided that the middle part of the continuum repre-
sents a permissible interpretation of the scope of the section 401
certification requirement, the Court saw no need to decide
whether the broadest construction of section 401 is also cor-
rect 201 The minimum flow requirement at issue in PUD No. 1
was defensible because it had been found to be necessary to pro-
tect Washington's designated uses for the Dosewallips River.;
02
The Court accordingly did not need to decide whether a state
could impose conditions on federal licenses under section 401(d)
to ensure compliance with state or local water-quality-related
laws that were not part of the state's approved WQSs.; 03
The majority opinion ended with a brief explanation of wh
its interpretation of the CWA did not create a conflict with
FERC's licensing authority under the FPA.20 4 The Court found
such a conflict to be "hypothetical. '205 Because section 401 also
applied to other federal permits and licenses, the Court was "un-
willing to read implied limitations into section 401. "206 The
Court stated that FERC might still decide to deny the application
at issue,2 07 or, "it is quite possible, given that FERC is required
to give equal consideration to the protection of fish habitat when
deciding whether to issue a license, that any FERC license would
201 This is the position adopted by the courts in Oregon and Washington. See
supra notes 167-170, 175-182 and accompanying text.
2M See supra notes 180-183 and accompanying text.
20 PUD No. 1, 114 S. Ct. at 1909-10. The Court left open the question of
"what additional state laws, if any, might be incorporated" by the "any other
appropriate requirement of State law" language in § 401(d): "We do not specu-
late on what additional state laws, if any, might be incorporated by this lan-
guage. But at a minimum, limitations imposed pursuant to state water quality
standards adopted pursuant to § 303 are 'appropriate' requirements of state
law." Id (footnote omitted).
One commentator contends that, because the Supreme Court has given
states such broad authority to protect all components of their WQSs, there is no
longer any significance to the question whether states may also act to protect
other state laws. See Ransel, supra note 187, at 268 ("When a state may include
in a section 401 certification any condition reasonably related to a designated or
existing use, a narrative or numeric criterion, or the antidegradation provision,
it is hard to imagine why it would have to rely on any other provision of state
law.").
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contain the same conditions as the State section 401
certification." 208
The majority opinion in PUD No. 1 demonstrates the attrac-
tion of the textualist or plain meaning approach to statutory in-
terpretation. Such an approach posits that interpretations are
straightforward and without controversy when the meaning of
the statutory text is plain.209 In the case of the CWA, the majority
viewed the meaning of the CWA as clear on its face: states may
condition their certification of a federal license or permit on
compliance with any aspect of their WQSs. Indeed, Justice Ste-
vens, in a brief concurrence, chided two of the Court's most
208 Id, The Court mentioned in this regard that, "at oral argument the Solici-
tor General stated that both EPA and FERC were represented in this proceed-
ing, and that the Government has no objection to the stream flow condition
contained in the § 401 certification." Id. (citation omitted). It is worth noting
that the Court is being quite naive in supposing that FERC, acting indepen-
dently under the FPA, would include in its license the same measures protective
of water quality and water uses, as those required by the state. See supra notes
88-93 and accompanying text (describing how FERC has not exercised its au-
thority-under the FPA to protect the environment).
The Court also suggested that, "[i]f FERC issues a license containing a
stream flow condition with which petitioners disagree,, they may pursue judicial
remedies at that time." PUD No. 1, 114 S. Ct. at 1914 (citation omitted). This
statement is difficult to interpret because FERC is required to include in its
licenses the conditions mandated by states acting pursuant to their § 401(d) au-
thority. Il at 1920 & n.5 (Thomas, J., dissenting). But see Ransel, supra note
187, at 268 n.91 (citing a recent FERC decision in which FERC declined to
include in its license state-mandated conditions that FERC believed were not
water quality related).
2w See Arthur W. Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The "Plain-Meaning
Rule" and Statutory Interpretation in the "Modern" Federal Courts, 75 CoLuM,
L. REv. 1299, 1299-1300 (1975); Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future
of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 352 (1994) ("The critical as-
sumption [of textualism] is that interpretation should be objective rather than
subjective; that is, the judge should ask what the ordinary reader of a statute
would have understood the words to mean at the time of enactment, not what
the intentions of the enacting legislature were.") (footnote omitted). Commen-
tators argue that the Supreme Court has become increasingly textualist in its
approach to interpreting statutes. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New
Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621 (1990); Merrill, supra. One commentator
has even argued that the Court has moved beyond textualism to "hypertextual-
ism." See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An
Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUtM.
L. REv. 749, 752 (1995) (Hypertextualism "refer[s] to two distinct but related
interpretive techniques: finding linguistic precision where it does not exist, and
relying exclusively on the abstract meaning of a particular word or phrase even
when other evidence suggests strongly that Congress intended a result inconsis-
tent with that usage"); Peter L. Strauss, On Resegregating the Worlds of Statute
and Common Law, 1994 Sup. CT. REv. 429, 444-47 (1994).
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steadfast adherents of the textualist approach to statutory inter-
pretation210 for their failure to follow their preferred method of
interpretation and uphold the state agency's action.211 He stated
that
[f]or judges who find it unnecessary to go behind the statutory
text to discern the intent of Congress, this is (or should be) an
easy case. Not a single sentence, phrase, or word in the Clean
Water Act purports to place any constraint on a State's power
to regulate the quality of its own waters more stringently than
federal law might require. In fact, the Act explicitly recog-
nizes States' ability to impose stricter standards.21
Justice Stevens' effort to highlight the irony of the position
taken by Justices Thomas and Scalia illustrates a key problem
with the textualist approach to interpretation, Too often that ap-
proach is not sensitive to context. The context for understanding
a statute is created by more than the text of the statute itself.2 13
By referring only to the CWA to explain the scope of a state's
power to regulate its waters, Justice Stevens' rejoinder reflects
the same narrow focus as the majority opinion; both are con-
cerned only with the CWA. Context and meaning however, are
also determined by the text of other statutes, which may define
competing or conflicting policies or rules.214 In the arena of
210 See Merrill, supra note 209, at 351,363. See also Pierce, supra note 209, at
777 (Justices Scalia and Thomas are among those who "are so hostile [to legisla-
tive history] that any reference to legislative history in a majority opinion is
virtually certain to draw a rebuke in a concurring or dissenting opinion") (foot-
note omitted). Justice Scalia has been characterized as "the most prominent
textualist on the contemporary Supreme Court." Wiwu i D. PoPmN, MATER-
IALS ON LEGISLATION: PoLTICAL LANGUAGE AND THE POLUTICAL PROCESS
337 (1993). Justice Thomas very often joins with Justice Scalia in opinions that
rely on plain meaning and reject reliance on other aids to interpretation. See,
e.g., Holder v. Hall, 114 S. Ct. 2581, 2591 (1994) (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia,
J., concurring).
211 It is worth reiterating that the dissent did attempt to explain the result it
supported by reference to only the text of the CWA. See supra notes 189-90
and accompanying text.
212 PUD No. 1, 114 S. Ct. at 1915 (citation omitted).
213 See supra note 209 (quoting Professor Pierce's description of the
hypertextualist approach to interpretation); see also Pierce, supra note 209, at
778 (suggesting that the Court's current hypertextualism "allows courts to ig-
nore the context in which language is used, reliance interests created by decades
of contrary interpretations, or strong evidence that Congress intended a con-
trary meaning").
214 Professor Dickerson has written that "[a]n internal contextual ambiguity
may result, for example, from an internal inconsistency: WThen one provision
plainly contradicts another, which is intended to prevail? Contextual ambigui-
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FERC hydropower licensing, the context is set not only by the
text and structure of the CWA, but also by the FPA;21 , the
Court's prior consistent interpretations of the FPA;216 and con-
gressional action relating to the FPA,21 7 which appears to have
accepted and built upon the Court's interpretations.
21 8
Although its simplicity is no doubt attractive to judges, the
textualist approach is in practice a dangerous interpretive
method, particularly when a court must consider the interrela-
tionship of two or more statutes.21 9 The Court's narrow focus in
ties may also be external. Thus a statute may bear a similarly ambiguous rela-
tionship to another statute with which it is inconsistent." REED DiCKERSON,
THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 47 (1975). Other com-
mentators agree about the importance of the interstatute context in creating
ambiguities. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey,'Statutory
Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 374-75 (1990)
(Congress will often give orders that become inconsistent over time, thereby
impelling the courts to alter one or more of the orders); Sidney A. Shapiro &
Robert L. Glicksman, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Quiet Revolution in
Administrative Law, 1988 DUKE LJ. 819, 868 (If courts fail to recognize "that
statutory interpretation involves many different statutes and applications of
those statutes to different substantive problems in different legal postures,"
then courts "will reach counterproductive or senseless results.") (footnotes
omitted); Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History
in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IowA L.'REv. 195, 199 (1983) ("In the
context of the statute, other related statutes, or the problems giving rise to the
statute, words may be capable of many different meanings, and the literal
meaning may be inapplicable or nonsensical."). These problems with ambiguity
and conflict arise because legislatures enact statutes at different times to ad-
dress different public policy issues and are hardly omniscient. See, e.g., 1A
NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY CONsTRucrION § 23.09 (4th
ed. 1985) ("The legislatures cannot be expected to have complete knowledge of
the detail contained in the statute laws of a state, nor have they the time to
extensively research the mass of statutory provisions in order to specify what
statutes should be repealed."); Wald, supra, at 213 ("The possibility that Con-
gress, on occasion, does pass inconsistent statutes or does not know that what it
is passing today is repealing, by implication, what it passed last month or last
year is a real one.").
215 See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
216 See supra notes 40-104 and accompanying text.
217 See supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
218 See'Kirsch & Seitz, supra note 20, at 10,444 ("Congress' failure to address
First Iowa and the virtually unbroken line of cases, striking down most
mandatory state regulations affecting hydroelectric projects, suggests congres-
sional satisfaction with the current [i.e. pre-PUD No. 1] division of authority.").
219 See Harry H. Wellington & Lee A. Albert, Statutory Interpretation and the
Political Process: A Comment on Sinclair v. Atkinson, 72 YALE LJ. 1547, 1551
(1963) who argue that:
Reliance on the plain meaning rule seems especially misplaced where two
or more statutes, passed at different times and often the product of differ-
ent political forces, bear upon an issue before the court. To assume that
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PUD No. 1 on CWA text likely led to an overly broad construc-
tion of that statute. Consider, for example, the Court's reference
to "aesthetics" as a permitted water quality criterion2 0 The
Court believed that allowing "aesthetics" to be applied as a water
quality criterion was significant because it demonstrated that
even such criteria can be quite subjective. Accordingly, there
should be no reason why water quality criteria alone should be
enforceable through the section 401 certification process, as op-
posed to designated uses or state nondegradation policy. This
exclusive consideration of the CWA's text may prove too much,
however, and result in an overinclusive interpretation.S1
Allowing a standard of "aesthetics" acceptable to the state
to be used as a basis for imposing conditions on a hydropower
license may mean that a state has the power to veto a project
based on what that state views as undue degradation of the aes-
thetics of its own waters without consideration of, among other
accommodation or reconciliation of apparently conflicting statutes is
work only for the legislature is to ignore the dynamics of the legislative
process.
See also Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 214, at 337-38 (stating that because of
the complex issues of statutory construction arising in this context, "one of the
most challenging tasks of any court is to unpack interacting statutory policies").
22 See supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text.
221 Professor Sunstein has written that "overinclusiveness" is one of a
number of "pervasive difficulties with textualist approaches to statutory con-
struction." Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103
HARV. L. REV. 405,418 (1989). In discussing how courts can address the prob-
lem of "overinclusiveness," he states that "language that would in many settings
be entirely unambiguous should not be the only basis for interpretation in some
cases; here, context is the central problem." Id at 420. He then argues that,
when applying the text literally WIll result in overinclusiveness, a court plays its
proper role in the legal system by narrowly construing the statute, notwith-
standing the broad text: "[S]ometimes the best interpretation of a textual com-
mand runs counter to its apparent literal meaning .... [T]he exclusion of the
absurd outcome should be seen not as amendment or usurpation, but as permis-
sible, indeed conventional interpretation." Id. at 421. See also DicKERSoN,
supra note 214, at 111 ("The most useful, indeed almost indispensable, function
of context is to narrow the range of reference of otherwise over-general
words."); PopxiN, supra note 210, at 602 ("The generality of statutory language
is sometimes more than the court can accept in light of the statutes purpose,
despite the apparent plain meaning of the words.") (footnote omitted). See
generally United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, 108 S. Ct. 1179, 1183 (1988) (nar-
row reading of "all taxation" so that exemption applies only to direct taxation).
Indeed, in Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1, 23-
25 (1976), the Court relied on an interstatutory conflict between the CWA and
the Atomic Energy Act to construe the term "radioactive materials" in the
CWA to exclude "source, byproduct, and special nuclear materials," notvith-
standing their radioactivity.
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things, the out-of-state demand for energy.= Thus, if one consid-
ers only a state's authority to use narrative water quality criteria,
such as "aesthetics," to condition or deny section 401 certifica-
tion, there may be circumstances where the state cannot exercise
the power seemingly accorded to it by the PUD No. 1 decision
without denying to FERC the power to balance the need for en-
ergy against other public values that the Court previously con-
cluded Congress had delegated to FERC when it enacted the
FPA.
It is curious indeed for the Court to decide a case that poten-
tially, if not directly, affects the allocation of power between state
environmental agencies and FERC in the licensing of hydro-
power facilities without ever confronting the preeminent place of
First Iowa in granting the federal agency paramount authority in
licensing. 224 This gap in the Court's decision is even more note-
worthy given, the Court's reaffirmation of First Iowa only four
terms before the PUD No. 1 decision in a case that inferred re-
cent congressional approval of the First Iowa allocation of
power22S and denied a state authority to dictate a minimum
stream flow requirement.22 6
Because of this important omission in the analysis, the
Court's opinion may be read as declining on prudential grounds
to address a statutory conflict until it is directly presented to the
Court. If, in actuality, the Court decided that the facts of PUD
No. 1 and the position of FERC in the case 227 provided conve-
nient grounds on which to avoid the critical issue that is
presented by the apparent conflict between these two important
statutes, then this new decision stands for very little. The Court
will have to resolve in some later case almost exactly the same,
222 Cf Ransel, supra note 187, at 271 ("After [PUD No. 1], it appears that
[when states consider certification requests during relicensing] the states may
act to attain water quality goals reflected in designated uses, even though a
federally licensed project may have eliminated the use.").
2z See supra notes 40-77 and accompanying text.
224 The First Iowa decision is discussed supra notes 40-58 and accompanying
text. The PUD No. 1 majority's only reference to First Iowa is in a brief discus-
sion of proprietary rights in which the Court rejects an argument made by the
applicants. See PUD No. 1, 114 S. Ct. at 1913. First Iowa is cited by the Court
as a case providing indirect support for its analysis. Id.
225 See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text (discussing California v.
FERC).
226 See supra note 68 and accompanying text (discussing California v. FERC).
227 FERC had not opposed the stream flow requirements dictated by the
state. See supra note 209.
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question of interstatutory conflict that was implicit in PUD No.
1.
Portions of the Court's decision, in fact, lend support to the
view that this case will have little lasting impact. Although the
majority had little to say about the relevance of First Iowa, it did
include an explicit discussion of California v. FERC.22 In dis-
cussing FERC's role in hydropower licensing, the Court stated
that
[t]he FPA empowers FERC to issue licenses for projects 'nec-
essary or convenient... for the development, transmission,
and utilization of power across, along, from, or in any of the
streams .. over which Congress has jurisdiction.' The FPA
also requires FERC to consider a project's effect on fish and
wildlife. In California v. FERC, we held that the California
Water Resources Control Board, acting pursuant to state law,
could not impose a minimum stream flow which conflicted
with minimum stream flows contained in a FERC license. We
concluded that the FPA did not 'save' to the States this
authority.
No such conflict with any FERC licensing activity is
presented here. 2 9
This quite cryptic statement seems to suggest that, notwith-
standing its decision to affirm the Washington Supreme Court
decision, the Court recognizes that what it has read as the plain
meaning of the CWA will have to be limited in either of two
ways. The Court may be-saying that, when a conflict between
FERC and a state does arise regarding section 401 certification,
FERC's power will trump the state's CWA certification author-
ity. If this is the meaning of the Court's statement, then PUD
No. 1 means little to state agencies and environmentalists.
Alternatively, the Court may be stating that, when a conflict
between FERC and a state does arise, courts will have to inquire
further into whether the state has the power to impose the condi-
tion on certification or deny certification altogether. The impact
of this alternative reading is that Washington was able to prevail
without a more searching analysis of its authority to impose the
stream flow condition onlk€ because FERC had approved in this
228 PUD No. 1, 114 S. Ct. at 1913-14.
229 Id. at 1914 (citations omitted). In addition to this more extended analysis,
the Court also cited to California v. FERC in discussing the relation between
minimum flow requirements and proprietary rights. Id at 1913.
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instance the substance of Washington's requirement. 230 If this
reading is correct, the Court may have to decide in some later
case whether section 401 of the CWA gives states more limited
authority in the context of certifying a hydropower license than it
does when another federal license or permit is involved.231
Another possible reading of the Court's opinion is that the
Court actually did decide that PUD No. 1 provided a convenient
vehicle to limit sub silentio the effect of First Iowa which, as the
Court had previously recognized, reflected an unnatural reading
of the text of the FPA.232 If this is, in fact, the actual significance
of PUD No. I and the power of FERC has been significantly
curtailed in relation to state environmental agencies, then the
case needs to be criticized on three grounds, despite any salutary
effect that it may have on the environment. First, if the Court
expects it to limit or overrule'First Iowa, its opinion displays a
striking and corrosive lack of candor. This lack of candor in fail-
ing to articulate the actual reasons for its'decision subverts the
role of the judiciary in the process of lawmaking. 233 Second, at a
230 See supra note 209 and accompanying text. As Justice Thomas stated,
"Even if FERC might have no objection to the stream flow condition ... in this
case, such a happy coincidence will likely prove to be the exception, rather than
the rule." PUD No. 1, 114 S. Ct. at 1920 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
231 The Court is, of course, wary of interpreting the same statutory text in
different ways. See Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 356 (1979)
("[P]roposals for legislation" includes either all appropriations requests or none
- the Court "will ordinarily decline to fracture the clear language of a stat-
ute"); see also Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 112 S. Ct. 25S9, 2596
(discussing the "basic canon of statutory construction that identical terms
within an Act bear the same meaning") (citations omitted), cert. denied, 505
U.S. 1218 (1992). Such a result, however, may have some precedent. See Mobil
Oil Corp. v. EPA, 871 F.2d 149, 153 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (upholding EPA's decision
to give the term "facility" in RCRA two different meanings in two different
provisions of that statute based on EPA's "belieff] that the legislative purposes
will best be satisfied by construing the term to mean different things in different
contexts...").
232 See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text. Justice Thomas apparently
took this view of the opinion: "Today, the Court gives the States precisely the
veto power over hydroelectric projects that we determined in California v.
FERC and First Iowa they did not possess." PUD No. 1, 114 S. Ct. at 1920
(Thomas, J., dissenting). See also Ransel, supra note 187, at 256 (stating that in
PUD No.1, "the Court laid waste to its previous opinion in California v.
FERC").
233 See Alexander M. Bickel & Harry H. Wellington, Legislative Purpose and
the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HArv. L. REv. 1, 14 (1957) ("A
decision by assertion has greatly reduced significance as part of the next prob-
lem's setting, and, given the value of articulation in the process of reasoning, is
more likely to be ill-advised."); Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 214, at 383
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substantive level, the Court's broad view of the CWA withdraws
from FERC the authority and discretion to balance, among other
things, wildlife and recreational considerations that Congress had
granted to FERC in the 1986 amendments to the FPA.2 4 To be
sure, strong legal arguments may be available to defend such a
decision,235 particularly if one prefers an evolutionary approach
to statutory interpretationp 6 The Court's opinion, however,
neither made nor relied upon those arguments. Third, the
Court's broad view of the CWA ignores entirely the federalism
issues that are inherent when considering the development of in-
terstate power: under the Court's apparent reading of CWA cer-
tification authority, a state has the power to ensure compliance
with all aspects of its WQSs, without regard to any impact on
interstate power or competing interests in water resources.2 7
("[A] candid explication of the reasoning process promises to narrow and high-
light the elements in dispute and fosters a deliberative dialogue about statutory
meaning in a concrete circumstance.").
234 See PUD No. 1, 114 S. Ct. at 1921 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that
the majority decision means that the § 401 certification process supersedes the
§ 10(j) process); Ransel, supra note 187, at 273. As explained by Ransel:
Where the demands of the various uses of a waterbody conflict, [PUD No.
1] says that the state water quality agency-not FERC-has the authority
to determine the conditions necessary to comply with state water quality
standards, including the many potentially conflicting use designations at-
tributed to the same river or stream segment.
See Ransel, supra note 187, at 273. See generally supra note 94 and accompany-
ing text (describing the § 10(j) process).
235 For example, the PUD No. 1 Court did not account in the least for how
FERC has responded to its broad role in considering the environmental impacts
of proposed projects. FERC has not been at all protective of the environment
and has rejected recommendations from state and federal agencies for projects
that would have offered some environmental protection. See supra notes MS-
104 and accompanying text. See also Hearing, supra note 7, at 217 ("All other
project features are compared to hydropower production on an economic basis.
If an environmental feature reduces hydropower benefits, the feature is
dropped.").
236 For an example of the evolutive approach to interpreting statutes, see
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 209-19 (1979) (Blackmun,
J., concurring), in which Justice Blackmun concludes that Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 permits businesses to engage in voluntary affirmative action
programs, because such programs are appropriate given the way that Title VII
has been understood and implemented.
237 Commentators have recognized that a strong federal licensing power is
needed to ensure that the parochial views of states do not foreclose either the
appropriate development of hydropower or proper environmentally responsive
conditions on operation. See Blumm, supra note 8, at 127 (footnotes omitted).
Blumm argues that:
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If PUD No. 1 is illuminating in demonstrating the'dangerous
allure of textualism, the case also demonstrates that even those
who forcefully promote that interpretive approach recognize its
limits. Thus, Justices Thomas and Scalia, while attempting to ex-
plain their interpretation of section 401 by using their usual tex-
tualist approach,238 also base their decision on the view that,
even if their reading of the text of the CWA is wrong, that statute
cannot mean what the majority says it means because such an
interpretation is inconsistent with "the larger statutory frame-
work governing the licensing process. ' 239 In effect, these Justices
argue that the CWA can be interpreted properly only in the con-
text of other law, both statutory and decisional.
The dissenters argue that the text of the CWA cannot bear
the majority's interpretation, because allowing states to use the
certification process to ensure the protection of designated uses,
as well as water quality criteria, grants states "limitless" authority
to impose conditions on hydropower projects2 40 In the dissent-
ers' view, granting such authority "significantly disrupts the care-
ful balance between state and federal interests that Congress
[A]mendments to the FPA should not give states an absolute veto over
licenses. For one thing, relicenses under the Federal Power Act are func-
tionally the equivalent of initial licenses. Thus, state veto authority could
be used to shut down existing projects which serve out-of-state markets, a
result Congress would not likely intend. Moreover, an absolute veto
would not necessarily ensure greater downstream fish and wildlife protec-
tion. For example, if fish protection required out-of-state downstream
flows, the upstream state might want to hold water in the project reservoir
to encourage consumptive uses. Consequently, a "states' rights" amend-
ment to the FPA should authorize the application of state laws to FERC
licenses only where state requirements would not produce unconstitu-
tional burdens on interstate commerce.,This would enable both FERC
and reviewing agencies to ensure that states do not use their authorities to
discriminate against downstream, out-of-state resources or uses.
Blumm, supra note 8, at 127 (citations omitted). See also PUD No. 1, 114 S. Ct.
at 1920 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (commenting that FERC considers and bal-
ances the nation's varied needs, while state environmental agencies "need only
consider parochial environmental interests") (citation omitted). Plouffe makes
a similar point:
The states have substantial knowledge and expertise in river planning, and
Congress should recognize their rightful role in determining the future of
their rivers. The challenge is to construct a statutory mechanism that ac-
cords the states their appropriate roles but continues to recognize the fed-
eral government's preeminent position in river resource allocation.
Plouffe, supra note 41, at 845.
238 See supra notes 189-90 and accompanying text.
239 PUD No. 1, 114 S. Ct. at 1921 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
240 Id. at 1918-19 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal
[Volume 5
THE ATTRACTION AND LIMITS OF TEXTUALISM
struck in the [FPA]. ' 241 This recognition of the significance of
context in-interpreting language is tantalizing, coming as it does
from jurists who on other occasions have tried to force isolated
statutory text to bear meanings entirely out of step with the con-
text established by statutory and decisional law.242 Their implicit
concession regarding the limits of textualism would, of course, be
more significant if they recognized that context must also be in-
formed by legislative history and the manner in which a law has
been implemented.
43
In sum, PUD No. 1 provides essential insights into textual-
ism as an approach to statutory construction, showing it to be an
approach that can lead to short sighted and questionable results.
CONCLUSION
After reflecting about the Supreme Court decision in PUD
No. 1, I recalled my high school chemistry teacher who, after ob-
serving my inelegant experimental techniques, stated that the
Jesuits used an old Latin expression in such circumstances-non
disputandum resultatem [sic]. He roughly translated this to mean
you don't argue with good results. Notwithstanding the experi-
mental techniques discussed here, the fact remains that the 1993
Supreme Court term yielded two results that are pro-environ-
ment-PUD No. 1 *and City of Chicago v. Environmental De-
241 Id. at 1919 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
242 See, e.g., Holder v. Hall, 114 S. Ct. 2581, 2591 (1994) (Thomas, J., joined
by Scalia, J., concurring).
243 See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 214, at 322 (describing "'practical rea-
son"' as a preferred method of judicial interpretation of statutes). Eskridge &
Frickey describe practical reason as "an approach that eschews objectivist theo-
ries in favor of a mixture of inductive and deductive reasoning (similar to the
practice of the common law), seeking contextual justification for the best legal
answer among the potential alternatives." Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 214,
at 322 n.3. Under this approach, a judge would begin with the "Most Concrete
Inquiry," which is the "Statutory Text." Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 214, at
353. The inquiry then extends out to include "Specific & General Legislative
History," "Legislative Purpose," "Evolution of the Statute," and ends with
"Current Policy," which is also the "Most Abstract Inquiry." Eskridge &
Frickey, supra note 214, at 353. The authors present the order of inquiry in this
way because it reflects the "hierarchy of sources," with the texi of the statute
being most persuasive to a court's interpretation. Eskridge & Frickey, supra
note 214, at 353. In short, they believe that a court should look widely to evalu-
ate the context in which it is interpreting a statute, before determining the stat-
ute's meaning.
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fense Fund.24 Both of these "good results" followed from the
application of the textualist interpretive technique.
2 45
In the area of statutory interpretation, unlike high-school
chemistry experiments however, good technique is at least as im-
portant as good results.246 A good interpretive approach re-
quires that courts consider more than mere text; they must
carefully consider context as well. In the legal dispute at the
heart of PUD No. 1, that context is defined not only by the
CWA, but also by the FPA, the Court's interpretations of that
statute, and how FERC and the state agencies have exercised the
powers that they believe have been delegated to them. In enact-
ing the FPA, Congress gave FERC the power to balance a variety
of interests, including aesthetic, wildlife protection, recreation,
preservation, and economic interests, against the need for en-
ergy. Congress also carved out an exception to FERC's authority
and gave states the power to ensure that projects do not violate
WQSs. Because, in conducting its balancing, FERC's concerns
about the economic, development, and electric power factors
have largely overwhelmed all other factors, 4 7 courts, when they
consider the interaction of the CWA and FPA, need to safeguard
the single consideration that Congress has identified as beyond
FERC's ability to balance out of existence. When interpreting
these statutes, courts must also not view the in-state water quality
factor so broadly that it alone overwhelms all other factors, at
244 114 S. Ct. 1588 (1994).
245 Professor Pierce uses City of Chicago as an example of the Court's reli-
ance on "hypertextualism." See Pierce, supra note 209, at 754, 761-62; see also
Richard J. Lazarus & Claudia M. Newman, City of Chicago v. Environmental
Defense Fund: Searching for Plain Meaning in Unambiguous Ambiguity, 4
N.Y.U. E rvm. L.J. 1, 19 (1995) ("The Supreme Court essentially adopted
EDFs plain meaning argument in its entirety.").
246 See Pierce, supra note 209, at 752 (stating that "[t]he inevitable result" of
the Supreme Court's recent reliance on a hypertextualist interpretive approach
"will be cacophony and incoherence throughout the administrative state").
247 Consider, for example, the dismaying story that Representative Gejden-
son tells about'the City of Norwich, Connecticut, which was trying to develop
Yantit Falls, a scenic park, into a regional tourist attraction. FERC wished to
license a hydroelectric plant at that site, which would have destroyed the scenic
value of the area, while providing a minimal amount of apparently excess en-
ergy. See Hearing, supra note 7, at 201-03. Representative Gejdenson stated:
"Despite overwhelming local opposition, the fact that these areas are being pro-
tected as parklands, economic factors, and aesthetic reasons, coupled with the
apparent lack of demand or need for the electricity, developers know that
FERC will issue a license regardless of the site or the level of local opposition."
Hearing, supra note 7, at 203.
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least some of which will have out-of-state impacts unlikely to be
considered by the state when identifying its WQSs.z43
248 To illustrate my point by reference to the continuum of interpretations of
state certification power under § 401, I believe that the correct interpretive
place along the continuum is the place marked by the Connecticut Superior
Court. See supra notes 164-165 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court's
decision in PUD No. 1 appears to give states the greater power that is associ-
ated with the position of the Vermont court along the continuum. See supra
notes 166 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court, of course, declined to
decide whether states have the certification power recognized by courts in Ore-
gon and Washington. See supra notes 167-170, 176-183 and accompanying text.
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